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Bedenk: Man liebt den kise wohl, indessen man deckt ihn zu.'
(Consider: We like cheese well enough, but we still cover it

up.')
-WILHELM

BUSCH*"

There has been an explosion of good academic work recently about
bankruptcy.' Some of it has attempted to identify a sort of essence or

* Professor of Law, University of California at Davis. I have presented portions of
this material at seminars for lawyers over the last couple of years and have profited from
the comments of co-panelists and participants. In particular, much of my thinking
crystallized while I was participating in a presentation organized by Randolph J. Haines
at the Northeast Bankruptcy Law Institute in Quebec City in August 1992. Thanks also
to participants in a faculty workshop at the University of Miami Law School.
** Quoted in BRIAN VICKERS, IN DEFENSE OF RHETORIC vii (1988).
1. I will focus here on conventional "law" work. Still, it is hard to distinguish some
of the "straight law" from some of what is done in the purlieus of economics and
corporate finance. See,e.g., Michelle J. White, The CorporateBankruptcy Decision, 3
J. ECON. PERSP. 124 (1989) [hereinafter White, Bankruptcy Decision]; Michelle J.
White, PersonalBankruptcy Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code: An Economic Analysis,
63 IND. L.J. 1 (1987).
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unifying core of bankruptcy.' I call this "mainline scholarship," for lack of
a better name. Alongside it stands a genre of scholarship that seems to
sidestep the austere parsimony of the "unifying core" material, seeking
instead to take account of the refractory complexity of bankruptcy practice.3
As much as I admire some of the mainline work, I have perhaps a greater
temperamental affinity for this "revisionist" material because it seems to do
a better job of keeping touch with the irreducible indeterminacy of
bankruptcy as a theater for human greed and betrayal, with all the attendant
hopes and disappointments. 4
Yet much of this revisionist scholarship, admirable though it may be,
seems in an important sense, less radical than it may appear at first glance.
For the revisionist scholarship shares with its more elegant predecessor the
fundamental assumption that there is a core of some sort in bankruptcy law.
Thus, mainline scholarship seeks to articulate the core of bankruptcy law in
ideas such as asset allocation, efficiency, and so forth-the standard jargon
of economics. Revisionist scholarship, to its great credit, tries to show how
bankruptcy, for all its dynamism and fluidity, serves recognizable social
goals (even if dynamism and fluidity are the goals that it serves). Both
mainline and revisionist scholarship are thus seen as irenic, in the theological sense of the term.

2. The conventional citation today is, of course, THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC
AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986). In this Article, I mean to associate a lot of
general work done in the genre of economics and corporate finance, as well. See, e.g.,
LucianA. Bebchuk,A New Approach to CorporateReorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV.
775 (1988); Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy andRisk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439
(1992).
3. See, e.g., Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of
Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 780-82 (1991); Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen
Knippenberg, The Implied Good Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving
Bankruptcy Policy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 919 (1991); and the much-cited debate between
Warren and Baird, Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775
(1987); Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution,Forum Shopping, andBankruptcy:A Reply

to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815 (1987). Some of this material is not easily classified.
See, e.g., James W. Bowers, Whither what Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy
Theory, and the Elementary Economics ofLoss Distribution,26 GA. L. REV.27 (1991).
4. There is also an impressive body of scholarship documenting the wide variations
in local bankruptcy practice. E.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue
Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganizationof Large, Publicly Held
Companies, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 11; Karen Gross, Perception and Reality: American

Bankruptcy Institute Survey on Selected Provisions of the 1984 Amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code, AM. BANKR. INST. (1987); THERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL.,
PERSISTENCE OF COMMUNITY: LOCAL VARIATIONS IN A NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY
SYSTEM (1991); THERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS (1989)
[hereinafter SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS].
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In this Article, I take a somewhat different spin on the problem by
suggesting that bankruptcy may harbor no purpose at all, except in the most
attenuated sense. Specifically, I suggest that the "purpose," if you can call
it that, of bankruptcy law may be to serve no purpose at all, other than to
take highly divisive conflicts over public policy and dispose of them under
the pretense that they have been resolved, while in fact not resolving them
at all. In effect, I attempt to exhibit bankruptcy as an "essentially contested
concept" -a mechanism that, by its nature and not by accident or inadequacy, harbors irreconcilable conflicts. 5 The idea, then, would be to use the
rhetoric of the law as a rallying-point for some kind of social solidarity,
while leaving important conflicts intentionally (and perhaps mercifully?)
unresolved. 6
It is obvious how this idea differs from standard "unifying core"
scholarship. Perhaps less obvious is how the idea differs from what I have
called revisionist work, but I think the difference is important and should be
emphasized. The standard revisionist texts seem to suggest that the arena of
conflict in bankruptcy law is structured as it is to serve as a kind of
therapeutic exercise in which "justice" will emerge from "combat," on the
metaphor, perhaps, of a trial.
My view is somewhat more skeptical (I do not say cynical). I tend to
view the matter as one of not so much solving a problem as getting rid of
it-putting it out of harm's way while keeping the books straight and general
principles intact. This idea, of course, is a kind of "purpose," just as the
number "one" is a kind of "prime number," in the sense that a prime is any
number that cannot be divided except by itself or one. But this is a
somewhat attenuated view of the term, and I will not let it me detain me
here.
As the reader may surmise, I believe that this view of things is a
helpful way of approaching a great many areas of the law.7 The principle

5. See BERNARD GALLIE, ESSENTIALLY CONTESTED CONCEPTS, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 167-98 (1955); see also BERNARD GALLIE, LIBERAL
MORALITY AND SOCIALIST MORALITY, IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 116-33
(Peter Laslett ed., 1956).
6. The standard view-that uncertainty is a cost to be minimized-is well set forth
in David A. Skeel, The UncertainState of an Unstated Rule: Bankruptcy's Contribution

Rule Doctrine After Ahlers, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221 (1989). For a rather different
approach to the problem of change in the law, see Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis
of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986). According to Kaplow, internal
inconsistency may not be a defect. See also Elizabeth Warren, Why Have a Federal
Bankruptcy System?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1093 (1992).
7. There is certainly no end to scholarship professing the law's indeterminacy.
Although I certainly do not wed myself to all of it, I am often persuaded by assertions
of indeterminacy in particular fields. On the other hand, many partisans on both sides of
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could be demonstrated in any of a number of facets of bankruptcy law.8 For
present purposes, I undertake to explore just one-the so-called "one-asset
case," which, I suspect, bulks so large in bankruptcy practice, but has
largely escaped the notice of bankruptcy commentators. 9 My argument is
that the one-asset case does not fit neatly into the framework of bankruptcy
law; and that has been precisely its job: to fit, but not neatly.'0
To make this point, I will proceed as follows: First, I will sketch out
what I mean by the one-asset case. Then, I will summarize the arguments-which are, in my view, both plausible and largely compelling-both
for and against the one-asset case. Finally, I will explore in more detail a
couple of problems that emerge in effecting one-asset plans.

the case seem to assume that indeterminacy is some kind of scandal. I see no necessity
for this linkage. In principle, such indeterminacy may serve the ends of society even if
no one had the remotest intention of achieving that result. On the impossibility of theory
in constitutional law and what to do about it, with a useful survey of earlier literature,
see Paul Campos, Against ConstitutionalTheory, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 279 (1992).
8. "Honorable mention" for contenders to pride of place in this Article might go to,
e.g., the matter of exemption planning. Compare Norwest Bank Neb., N.A. v. Tveten,
848 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1988) with Smiley v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Smiley), 864 F.2d

562 (7th Cir. 1989).
9. As I write, the new American Bar Institute/St. John's Law Review is preparing
a special issue on single-asset cases, scheduled for publication in January, 1993. Other
discussions include Brian S. Katz, Single-Asset Real Estate Cases and the Good Faith
Requirement, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 77 (1992); Daniel J. Tyukody, Jr., Note, Good Faith
Inquiries Under the Bankruptcy Code: Treatingthe System Not the Cause, 52 U. CHI.

L. REv. 795 (1985).
10. I will develop my arguments for "systematic ambiguity" at greater length below.
For the moment, I note that it is at least conceivable that either Congress or the Supreme
Court could put an end to the ambivalence by an authoritative pronouncement of some
sort (though even here, it is perhaps questionable how effective the "sovereign" might
be in getting obedience at the trench level). While I was drafting this Article, I had
momentary pangs of concern that one or the other of these bodies might undermine me
with a spasm of clarity and simplicity. Remarkably, both of them have now rejected
efforts to do so.
As to Congress, a provision in the proposed S. 1985 would have limited, and thus
implicitly legitimated, the powers of the stay in one-asset cases. See S. 1985, 102d

Cong., 2d Sess. § 211 (1992). But the provision was not included in the companion
House bill and was dropped from the proposed compromise measure in conference
committee. See ABI LEGIS. BULL., vol. Im, no. 7, Oct. 8, 1992.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court's certiorari docket included at least two cases that
provided opportunities for the Justices to address the issue. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in both cases. See Greystone III Joint Venture v. Phoenix Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 113 S. Ct. 72 (1992), denying cert. to 995 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1991);
Bryson Properties XVIII v. Travelers Ins. Co., 113 S. Ct. 191 (1992), denying cert. to
961 F.2d 496 (4th Cir.).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/7
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I. THE ONE-ASSET CASE: A SKETCH
The following scenario is a paradigm one-asset Chapter 11 case:
The debtor is a limited partnership, with a corporate general partner
and investor/limited partners who signed on in large part to reap the
bounty of partnership tax deductions." The partnership owns a medical
office building with a present market value of perhaps $4 million. The
partnership owes $10 million to Insco, an institutional lender who
financed the acquisition and retained a mortgage that is "nonrecourse,"
in the sense that the mortgagee may look only to the asset for satisfaction of his claim. The partnership also has contracts with a supplier of
management services for the office building and with a supplier of
bookkeeping services for the partnership; but in each case, the partnership is current on its obligations to the contracting parties. The property
yields enough to cover current operating expenses, but not nearly
enough to service the debt or, by definition, to return any income to
limited partners.'
Insco has begun foreclosure proceedings and is about to go to sale.
If the project is terminated, then the individual limited partners will
sustain substantial "rollup liabilities"-i.e., they will face demands to
pay tax liabilities in cash with no corresponding infusion of liquidity to
pay them.
One-asset cases cannot be formally categorized, because individual
cases tend to blur off at the edges. 3 In any event, not every detail of my

11. See, e.g., WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET AL., EFFECTS OF
ON PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS (1987).

1986 TAX LAW

CHANGES

12. If the valuation at the beginning of the problem is accurate, then necessarily the
project does not earn enough to service debt. Given a $4 million valuation, an assuming
a current interest rate of 10%, the project would yield $400,000 beyond current operating
expenses for debt service and would need to earn another $600,000 to break even.
13. Judge Edith Jones, who has perhaps been as unsympathetic as anyone to the oneasset case, recognized as much in Humble Place Joint Venture v. Fory (In re Humble
Place Joint Venture), 936 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1991). Judge Jones stated:
There are several instances in which even one-asset real estate ventures would
invoke Chapter 11 in good faith: the asset may be an operating business, like
a ranch or a hotel; the development might be nearing the end of construction
whose completion would markedly enhance the asset's value; and even a
venture including undeveloped property might file to protect true owner equity
when market conditions suggest the remedy of a debt restructuring, as
opposed to simple liquidation, and the likelihood of prompt resale.
Id. at 818. Recognizing this statement as a careful effort at analytical precision, still the
very seriousness of purpose on display here suggests just how hard the problem of
distinction might be. For example, "an operating business like a ranch or a hotel" will
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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sketch is necessary to my model, but several features of the scenario are
noteworthy, as follows. Perhaps most obvious is the single asset that gives
the category its name. In the paradigm case, the debtor may own assets
other than the office building, but they tend to be pretty trifling-e.g., some
partnership letterhead, a half-used checkbook, or a vacuum cleaner. The
office building is far and away the only asset of any importance to anyone.
In the nature of things, it is perfectly proper to think of the asset as an
irreducible entity, like a Liebnizian monad: it was here before the show
starts, and it will be here after the show is over."
A little less obvious, but perhaps more important, is the nature of the
debt. Under the paradigm facts, there is only a single creditor with a single
claim. This is perhaps a tad more sticky in practice because an entity such
as this will usually have at least some "pocket-change" unsecured creditors.
Some such debtors may have unsecured liabilities that are very large,
indeed. But in many cases where the unsecured liabilities are small, the
parties act almost as if the unsecured liabilities are nonexistent." Typically
the unsecured claims will be for operating services that must be paid to keep
the project going. In fact, ironically, sometimes the trick will be to
manufacture an event of nonpayment for the purpose of creating a creditor
class to accept the plan.16 But the driving point is that the secured creditor
predominates-so much so that the case might well have been called a "onecreditor case," although the distinction is not essential.
II. WHY THE ONE-ASSET CASE HAS No BUSINESS IN

BANKRUPTCY COURT
One could make a perfectly respectable argument that the one-asset

likely have many creditors, and so will a building nearing completion. Moreover, it is
hard to see just what Judge Jones meant by "market conditions [that suggest] the remedy
of a debt restructuring, as opposed to simple liquidation and the likelihood of prompt
resale." The debtor's argument virtually always rests on the predicate that there is a
"true" market value that will be recognized given time.
14. Technically, of course, you could tear down the office building and sell off the
components. In some of the more dismal recesses of the inventory of the Resolution

Trust Corporation, this is perhaps a likely scenario. But for a far more common category
of cases it simply isn't a factor, and that is how I treat it here.

15. For example, in In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 102 B.R. 560 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1989), aff'd, 127 B.R. 138 (W.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd, 995 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72 (1992), the proponents proposed to pay three percent
on trade claims and on an unsecured deficiency, but made no attempt to bar trade
creditors from pursuing the partnership or the general partner after bankruptcy.
16. See infra note 102 (discussing requirement for confirmation in 11 U.S.C. §
1129(a)(10) that at least one impaired class accept plan).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/7
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case, as described above, has no business in bankruptcy court. The
argument would go as follows.
We can identify a number of substantive concerns that may be regarded
collectively as the essence or purpose of bankruptcy law. The earliest, and
historically the most important, is the "orchestration of claims." This is the
process of taking the debtor's property and dividing it among his creditors
as their interests may appear. This ordered distribution of assets is in
contrast to the regime of "grab law" that exists outside of bankruptcy, under
state law.' 7 A second and more familiar purpose is to give the debtor a
discharge-the traditional "fresh start" for the "honest but unfortunate
debtor" to permit him to go forward free of the burden of his past
obligations. 8 A third purpose, perhaps somewhat more difficult to grasp,
but nonetheless essential to modem bankruptcy law, is the preservation of
going-concern values. Strictly speaking, one might say that this purpose is
a subset of item #1 above: one reason for orchestrating claims is to preserve
going-concern values. But the idea of orchestration became popular long
before anyone focused on the idea of preserving going-concern values.
Moreover, the idea of preserving going-concern values seems particularly
linked to the developing notion of bankruptcy as a device for reorganizing,
as distinct from merely liquidating, a debtor.
Why itemize these purposes of bankruptcy law? The point, of course,
is that when these traditional purposes are measured against the one-asset
case, one must concede that none of these purposes is at stake in the oneasset case. Orchestration? In the pure case there is no need for orchestration,
because there is only one creditor. Even if more creditors exist, generally
one creditor will have a secured position that comes first under either state
or federal law. And if unsecured creditors are involved, frequently they are
trivial in the aggregate amount of their claims. In any event, typically both
the secured creditor and the debtor want to make sure that any unsecured
creditors are paid so that the building will continue to operate unimpeded.
Discharge? The core idea of the discharge is the protection of individual
debtors. However, in the example, the debt is nonrecourse, which means
that creditors cannot pursue any individual debtor. Indeed, absent bankruptcy, liability would simply die with the liquidation of the asset."9 The same
17. I take the phrase "grab law" from Maclachlan. For classic accounts of
bankruptcy as a matter of claims orchestration, see, e.g., JAMES A. MACLACHLAN,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 3 (1956); see also HARVEY M. LEBOWITZ,

BANKRUPTCY DEsKBOOK 29-31 (2d ed. 1990). For a vivid discussion of creditor
collection strategies against a faltering pre-petition debtor, see generally LYNN M.
LOPuCKI, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS INBANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS, chs. 2-4 (2d ed.
1991).
18. See generally3 COLLIERON BANKRUPTCY
523.01-.23, 524.01-.04 (Lawrence
P. King ed., 15th ed. 1992).
19. The general partner has a kind of "unlimited" liability, of course; however, the

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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with preserving going-concern values-the traditional "core principle" of
reorganization law. There are no going-concern values to preserve in a oneasset case: the office building almost certainly will be retained as an office
building; the only question is who will own it.2"
If all of this is true, then very little is left. If the debtor can keep the
Chapter 11 case in court, he may succeed in deferring foreclosure and,
ultimately, in effecting a plan with creditors (i.e., scaling down the debt
while retaining the property). Nevertheless, every state has a foreclosure
procedure of its own, and virtually every state-law procedure includes a
mechanism that permits the debtor to protect itself against precipitous
creditor action. Even under state law, the effect of these limitations on
foreclosure is to permit the debtor to continue to gamble with the creditors'
money.
If all of this is true, then the only purpose of the one-asset bankruptcy
case is to permit the bankruptcy court to serve as a "court of equitable
appeals" from state mortgage foreclosure law. It is dubious, to put it mildly,
2
that Congress ever intended bankruptcy to be used in this way. 1
As an additional approach to the issue, it may be useful to sketch a
"classic" Chapter 11 case, and then to note how much it differs from the
one-asset case outlined above. In the classic case, the debtor is a closely
held corporation where at least some of the creditors are also involved in the
management of the corporation. The debtor corporation may owe debt to
creditors who hold a security interest in the real estate or inventory and
receivables, as well as to an array of unsecured creditors lumped together
generally as "the suppliers," or more generally as "the trade." The
individual principals of the debtor corporation may have given their personal
guarantee to the secured creditors, and some "insiders" may be personally
liable for, e.g., trust fund tax claims.'
general partner is typically a corporation with limited liability and with no significant
assets of its own, aside from its interest in the disputed property. Of course the limited
partners may go broke paying their tax liability, but they can file their own bankruptcy
petitions. Although tax liability is not desirable, its nondischargeability represents one
of the more carefully thought-out policies in bankruptcy law.
20. This is a common point of confusion. Bankruptcy advocates seeking to justify
retaining prebankruptcy management in an operating business case frequently appeal to
the need to preserve going-concern values. But this argument loses sight of the fact that

the going-concern values may survive in a great many cases whether or not the old equity
owners retain a stake.
21. Some cases under old Chapter X suggested that it was improper to use
bankruptcy laws to supplant state mortgage foreclosures. See Marine Harbor Properties,
Inc. v. Manufacturer's Trust Co., 317 U.S. 78 (1942); Biltmore Grande Apartment Bldg.
Trust v. Muskat (In re Biltmore Grande Apartment Bldg. Trust), 146 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.
1944); In re Champ Brewing Co., 72 F. Supp. 764 (M.D. Pa. 1947).
22. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 3102(a)-(b), 3402(a) (1988) (requiring employers to withhold
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/7
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Several facts about this classic case deserve to be noted. First, it likely
involves going-concern values, which can be preserved through the
bankruptcy process and which might be lost otherwise. Second, a lot of
people have interests in preserving the firm as a going concern. For
example, the principals presumably depend on the firm for their livelihood,
and, in any event, if the firm goes under they will likely never see such a
good a job again. Moreover, they have a powerful stake in maximizing the
value of firm assets to minimize their personal exposure on guarantees and
statutory tax liabilities. Not quite so obvious, the trade creditors/suppliers
have an interest in the survival of the firm sufficient to make them virtual
allies of the residual owners. If the firm liquidates, all of the proceeds will
likely go to the secured creditors, and the trade creditors will receive
nothing. Moreover, for some of the suppliers, the debtor might be an
irreplaceable customer.
All of these considerations impel the debtor and the unsecured creditors
to collaborate on protecting the going-concern values by preserving the firm.
In this scenario, the important parts of the bankruptcy process-e.g., the
automatic stay' and the presumption in favor of a debtor-in-possession 24-serve the interests of the allied adversaries alike. The auguries are
good for a consensual plan.' Indeed, the very likelihood of a consensual
plan suggests that such cases are likely to create the least friction and excite
26
the least attention.
This classic Chapter 11 scenario is derived, perhaps, from the kind of
case that was common under old Chapter XI of the pre-1978 Bankruptcy
Act.27 Clearly, this scenario differs significantly from the one-asset

payroll income and social security taxes from employee paychecks); Id. § 7501(a) (1988)
(declaring that the employer holds such funds "in trust for the United States"). If the
employer fails to pay over trust fund taxes, the government may collect them directly
from the responsible offer or employee. Id. § 6672(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The stay not only prevents creditors
from taking action against the debtor, but also bars action against property of the
estate-a provision which has the effect of protecting the assets against dismemberment,
whether or not the old residuary owners are interested in doing so.
24. Id. §§ 1104, 1106 (1988).

25. See id. §§ 1123, 1129 (setting forth the plan requirements).
26. Which is to say, these cases result in the fewest reported decisions. Several years

ago, there was a spate of publicity about so-called "prepackaged plans," as if they were
something new. In fact, it is fairly clear that the Code was designed for the administration of prepackaged plans on the very scenario as described here. See In re TS Indus.,

117 B.R. 682, 688-89 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990); In re Colonial Ford, Inc., 24 B.R. 1014
(Bankr. D. Utah. 1982).
27. The scenario under old Chapter X was, of course, different; but for the purposes

of the present discussion, I do not think the distinctions are material. Old Chapter X was
designed to oust alleged malefactors and to simplify complex capital structures. 6
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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scenario outlined above. It is not possible to get good data suggesting just
how many current cases look like the paradigm one-asset case and how
many look like the classic case. I suspect that the one-asset cases far
outnumber the classic cases; but you would never guess so from listening to
bankruptcy lawyers or professors, nor from listening to bankruptcy lore.
III. WHY THE ONE-ASSET CASE IS A GOOD USE OF THE

BANKRUPTCY PROCESS
The foregoing, in summary, is the case against the one-asset case. I
suppose that many readers would be happy to leave it there-to endorse my
suggestion that the bankruptcy process has no role to play in one-asset cases
and that such cases are just as well left to state foreclosure law. But I do not
want to leave it there. Rather, to the contrary, one can make a pretty good
case for leaving the one-asset case just about where it is.
Although the "principles and purposes" of bankruptcy law outlined
above-orchestrating claims, giving a discharge, and protecting goingconcern values-are familiar basic principles, none of them is a formal
requirement for a bankruptcy filing. As to orchestrating claims, in most
bankruptcy cases there is nothing to distribute and, thus, nothing to
orchestrate.28 Also, the Code recognizes that in many cases there is no
need for, or possibility of, a discharge.2 9 And the idea of preserving goingconcern values, although it may be functionally important to Chapter 11, is
no more than hinted at in the text of the statute.30
Indeed, if the statute is relevant at all, one can make a respectable, if
not conclusive, case that the drafters intended the bankruptcy process to
accommodate the one-asset case. Present Chapter 11 was drafted against the

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 0.08 (14th ed. 1978). However, the major premise of all
of this was that there were going-concern values to be preserved, in the interest of
debtors and creditors alike.
28. See generally SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS, supra note 4,
at 203 (estimating that over 87 %of personal Chapter 7 bankruptcies can pay nothing to
creditors beyond administrative expenses).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988) (providing grounds for denying discharge in Chapter 7,
including the familiar "wrongdoing" grounds, as well as the general principle that there
will be no discharge in a liquidating case for a corporation); cf. id. § 1141 (1988)
(providing for discharge in Chapter 11).
30. The notion of going-concern value seems to be implicit in 11 U.S.C. §
1129(a)(7) (1988), which provides that a dissenting impaired creditor must receive not
less than he would receive in Chapter 7. As a practical matter, this requirement seems
to presuppose that the typical Chapter 11 creditor will receive a payout keyed to the
higher going-concern value, rather than the lower Chapter 7 liquidation value. Ironically,
while this may be true enough in practice, it is by no means a necessity in principle:
some businesses will be worth more in liquidation than as going concerns.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/7
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template of prior law and must be understood as assimilating the presuppositions of prior law, except as expressly overruled.31 That template included
not only old Chapters X and XI, but also old Chapter XII. 32 At the time
of the Bankruptcy Code's enactment, courts regularly administered cases
under old Chapter XII that bore a strong resemblance to the one-asset case
described above. 33
Just as there is apparent statutory support for the one-asset case, so also
is there judicial support. Numerous courts have upheld the propriety of oneasset cases. On the other hand, a number of courts have found them
improper on particular facts. 34 However, perhaps most interesting is not

31. This legislative policy is not express, but rather inevitable, in the sense that a
legislature cannot possible have operated any other way. To see my point, consider two
of the first principles of bankruptcy law: (1) that creditors of an equivalent class share
pro rata in assets available to that class; and (2) that secured creditors go to the head of
the line. I have no doubt that both of these principles are true; but no where in the
bankruptcy statute are they spelled out. They exist because everyone knows they
exist-so obvious that they do not need to be stated. On the same principle, I know of
no domestic relations statute that makes marriage a necessary condition of divorce.
32. Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 917 (1938) (repealed 1978); see 124 CONG. REc.
32,419-20 (1978) (statement of Rep. McClory).
33. See, e.g., Great Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Pine Gate Assocs., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
(CRR) 1478 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1976); cf. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Marietta
Cobb Apartments Co. (In re Marietta Cobb Apartments Co.), 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR)
720 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1977); In re Hobson Pike Assocs., 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR)
1205 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1976); Darvilla Hous. Corp. v. Accousti (In re Accousti), 2
Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1093 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1976). Admittedly, the argument does
not end here. Chapter XII was apparently enacted to respond to an anomaly under Illinois
mortgage law. For reasons not pertinent here, property that in other states would have
been held by a corporation (and thus eligible for Chapter X) would be held by an
individual under Illinois law. Only later, according to this theory, did counsel discover
the virtues of Chapter XII for the modern real-estate workout. See Pine Gate, 2 Bankr.
Ct. Dec. (CRR) at 1487 ("Nowhere in Chapter XII is there any exclusion of the benefits
of Chapter XII to a debtor having only one secured creditor."); see also Richard F.
Dole, Jr., The ChapterXII Cram-Down Provisions, 82 COM. L.J. 197, 197-204 (1977).
Part of the folklore of bankruptcy law is that Judge Norton's opinion in Pine Gate had
more to do with the shape of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code than any other decision.
Mortgagees, so it is said, were so eager to do away with the holding of Pine Gate that
they would accept virtually any compromise to achieve its overruling. That may be true,
but I do not care. My purpose here is not to close the inquiry, but only to muddy the
water a bit.
34. See, e.g., Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693, 705 (4th Cir. 1989)
(recognizing that one-asset debtors are "proper subjects for Chapter 11 relief," but
affirming dismissal for lack of good faith); Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd. v. Life Ins. Co. (In
re Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd.), 849 F.2d 1393 (11th Cir. 1988) (concluding that a one-asset
debtor's threat to forestall pending state court foreclosure by filing a Chapter 11 petition
in a distant forum supports dismissal of petition as bad-faith filing); Albany Partners,
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what the courts have said, but what they have refused to say. Specifically,
they have resisted virtually all entreaties to find the one-asset case improper
per se. Instead, they have embraced either of two stratagems popular with
judges who do not want to see their decisions corrupted by principle. One
approach is the notion of "good faith": rather than seeking to articulate a
governing rule for one-asset cases, judges go to great lengths to keep them
under the more amorphous and flexible rubric of good faith. 5
The second evasive tactic is the use of "factors": long lists of items that
a subsequent court may, or might, or must consider in deciding how to
apply a supposed principle. The "one-asset" feature of a case typically
appears on such a list, but only as one among many. The listing of "factors"
for decision certainly represents an admirable instinct for precision. But as
anyone who has ever owned a Jaguar must know, the more complicated the
machine, the more likely it is to break down. I know a judge/teacher who

says that he tells his students: "Whenever the Court of Appeals names more
than three factors, you can ignore them all."36
Nevertheless, it is abundantly clear that court approval of one-asset
cases continues apace.37 And aside from Chapter 11, courts have used the

Ltd. v. Westbrook (In re Albany Partners, Ltd.), 749 F.2d 670, 674 (11th Cir. 1984)
(affirming dismissal for lack of good faith because one-asset debtor had no realistic
chance of reorganization).
35. I must make a confession of interest here. As a judge, I once opined against what
then seemed to me the excesses of "good faith" as a decisional framework in this area.
See In re Victory Constr. Co., 42 B.R. 145, 148-49 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984). Fat lot
of good it did me. On the other hand, my views on this issue have evolved somewhat
over time. I used to assume that the deployment of good faith represented nothing more
than a deplorable failure of intellectual energy on the judge's part. I can see now that
what is going on here is a studied resistance against formulation, even where it could be
done. For a somewhat different view of the good-faith issue, see Ponoroff &
Knippenberg, supra note 3. Their footnote 11 includes a useful bibliography of earlier
work. See id. at 923 n.11.
36. I assume the source of this remark would just as well remain anonymous in this
context, but it is not me.
37. See, e.g., In re Royal Palm SquareAssocs., 124 B.R. 129, 132-33 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1991) (one last chance); CFC 78 Partnership B v. Casa Loma Assocs. (In re Casa
Loma Assocs.), 122 B.R. 814, 818-19 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991) (one-asset repeat filing);
In re Blueberry Hill Apartments, Ltd., 124 B.R. 59, 62-63 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990)
(denying motion to dismiss); In re Forest Ridge, II, Ltd. Partnership, 116 B.R. 937, 943
(Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1990) (stating that the fact that the debtor has only one asset is
relevant but not dispositive); In re Marion St. Partnership, 108 B.R. 218, 223 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1989) ("The mere fact that this is a single asset case does not demonstrate that
the filing was made in bad faith."); In re Club Assocs., 107 B.R. 385 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1989), aff'd sub nom. First Union Real Estate Equity &Mortgage Invs. v. Club Assocs.
(In re Club Assocs.), 956 F.2d 1065 (11th Cir. 1992); In re Coral Springs Med. Ctr.
Assocs., 99 B.R. 112, 113 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989); In re North Redington Beach
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/7
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bankruptcy process in a number of instances to correct perceived deficiencies in state mortgage foreclosure law. 8
Although not authority in the strict sense, perhaps the ultimate
endorsement of the one-asset case comes from the United States Supreme
Court, in the well-known Timbers case. 39 Although the propriety of the
petition was not at stake in Timbers, the facts of the case put it well within
the category of the one-asset case as defined here. And no one has suggested
that Timbers was not properly within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court.
Although courts have shown a generalized lack of sympathy for oneasset cases, they have been notably unwilling to exclude such cases from the
bankruptcy arena. Indeed, the courts' general handling of the issue offers
strong support for the general principle set forth here-the idea that the
ambivalence is deep-seated and persistent, and that there are strong impulses
to leave the issue unsettled. Such is my general case. I turn now to two
particular points that merit more extensive treatment.
A. "Other Peoples' Money"
One of the best ways to see the tension between the various groups of
interest holders in a Chapter 11 case is to consider the role of the manager
of a bankruptcy estate. 4" The following scenario illustrates the competing

Assocs., 91 B.R. 166 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988) (declining to extend Phoenix and Little

Creek); cf. Home Fed. Say. v. Club Candlewood Assocs. (In re Club Candlewood
Assocs.), 106 B.R. 752, 755 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) (dismissing petition as filed in bad
faith; but stating that a "two-party dispute, alone, is insufficient to find bad faith-and
absent other circumstances, would probably be insufficient in this case even in
conjunction with the one-asset, few-employees, relatively-small-unsecured-debtfactors"),
appealdismissed, 106 B.R. 758 (N.D. Ga. 1989); In re Garsal Realty, Inc., 98 B.R. 140
(Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 1989) (granting relief from stay, but cautioning against excessive use
of dismissal power; criticizing Phoenix).
38. See, e.g., DiPierro v. Taddeo (In re Taddeo), 685 F.2d 24, 25 (2d Cir. 1982)
("We do not believe that Congress labored for five years over this controversial question
only to remit consumer debtors-intended to be the primary beneficiaries of the new
Code-to the harsher mercies of state law."); In re Tucker, 131 B.R. 245, 246 (Bankr.
D. Me. 1991) (recognizing "the policy objective of encouraging home ownership through
a strong home mortgage market"), overruled by In re Simcock, 152 B.R. 7 (Bankr. D.
Me. 1993).
39. See United Say. Ass'n. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365
(1988) (holding that undersecured creditor had no right to "lost opportunity cost" in the
pendency of the Chapter 11 case).
40. I choose this distinctive phrase-"manager of a bankruptcy estate"-advisedly.
The manager of the Chapter 11 estate may be either the trustee, or the debtor-inpossession ("DIP") with the powers of a trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1988).
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concerns in a typical case:
You represent DebtorCo, the debtor in a Chapter 11 proceeding.
Claims outstanding against DebtorCo total $1 million, and DebtorCo has
$1 million cash in the Bank. Your client has an investment opportunity
with an expected gross return of $1 million (i.e., a net return of zero),
subject to the following probabilities: there is a fifty-percent chance that
the project will yield $2 million gross and a fifty-percent chance that it
will yield zero.
The managers of DebtorCo-the people who hired you, and whom
you talk to every day-all were elected by the prepetition shareholders;
indeed, several of them are shareholders themselves. The managers all
want to press forward with a plan built around this investment opportunity ("Plan I"). The creditors' committee wants to press for immediate
liquidation and distribution of the cash on hand ("Plan II").
The motivations on each side are clear enough. The shareholders get
nothing under Plan II. They may also get nothing under Plan I, but they
stand a fifty-percent chance of getting $1 million (i.e., the $2 million
return less $1 million for creditors' claims). On the other hand, the
creditors get paid in full under Plan II. They might get paid in full under
Plan I, but they stand a fifty-percent chance of losing everything.
What are your responsibilities as counsel? Must you favor Plan I over
Plan II? Plan II over Plan I? Would it be permissible for you to refuse to
take a stand? This is a highly stylized problem designed to expose a
difficulty that underlies, to some degree or other, virtually any operating
bankruptcy case. The question is: What is the responsibility of management
when faced with two "equal" claims?4"

Typically, the equity holders of the debtor want to exercise DIP powers for tactical
reasons, if not otherwise. Although the retention of the DIP is generally viewed as
"tilting towards equity," this perception is not necessarily true. If the trustee standard is
applied with rigor, the DIP may find that he gets no special advantage from remaining
in possession. On the other hand, some pro-equity arguments subsist independent of
whether there is a DIP. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text (discussing Central
Ice Cream).
41. These claims are "equal" in that each one has the same net return. Strictly
speaking, of course, basic finance theory would hold that these two choices are not equal
at all, because the hypothetical rational investor has not only an enthusiasm for return,
but also an aversion to risk. Other things being equal, a rational investor favors less risk
to more. Suppose this particular enterprise were financed with all equity (i.e., no debt)
by a single investor. Given the two choices, the investor would favor Plan IIto Plan I
(even though returns are equal) because the risk of Plan II is smaller. Under these
constraints, it is easy enough to imagine a project where the total return, discounted for
risk, of two different projects is indeed "equal." See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY &
STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 161-65 (4th ed. 1992)
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/7
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There is a substantial literature on this and related questions in
connection with solvent or near-solvent companies. 4' Although the claim
seems central to bankruptcy law, it has received surprisingly less attention
than one might expect. Conventional presentations can sidestep the issue
because, in practice, the obligation of the manager of the estate is typically
masked behind the vaporous pieties of the "business judgment" rule.4 3 To
be sure, there is a considerable literature that addresses the issue more or
less clearly from the standpoint of "economics." Thus, a number of critics
have sought to show that, under the conventions of economic argument,
Chapter 11 makes no sense.44 Some more recent work offers ad hoe
adjustments of the primitive economic model, to try to save appearances in
the face of awkward brute fact. 5 Others, while not insisting so on any such
stylized model of the possible world, have treated Chapter 11 as a more
general instance of systems failure, but offer corresponding proposals for
reform.46 A small (but interesting) body of literature seeks to locate a more

(discussing the capital-asset pricing model). For more on hypothetical all-equity
financing, see infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text (discussing CentralIce Cream).
42. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., ShareholdersVersus Managers:The Strain in
the CorporateWeb, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1986).

43. See, e.g., Raymond T. Nimmer & Richard B. Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business
Governance:Fiduciary Duties, Business Judgment, Trustees and Exclusivity, 6 BANKR.
DEV. J. 1 (1989); Lewis U. Davis, Jr. et al., CorporateReorganization in the 1990s:
Guiding Directorsof Troubled CorporationsThrough UncertainTerritory,47 Bus. LAw.
1 (1991); Gregory V. Varallo & Jesse A. Finkelstein, FiduciaryObligationsof Directors
of the Financially Troubled Company, 48 Bus. LAW. 239 (1992).
44. See Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for CorporateReorganizations, 15 J.
LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986); Adler, supra note 2; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Is

CorporateBankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411 (1990) (making the efficiency of
Chapter 11 an analytical, rather than a synthetic, problem).
45. See Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An

Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155 (1989).
46. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargainingover Equity's Share
in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 125 (1990) [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share];
LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 4; Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford,
Preemptive Cram Down, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625 (1991); Michael Bradley & Michael
Rosenzweig, The Untenable Casefor Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992). All of
these studies focus on large public companies in which management is typically
dissociated from ownership. In such cases, it may appear that management is mainly
interested in feathering its own nest, and, therefore, any benefits to residuary owners
occur, if at all, only fortuitously. But cf. Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 173 (1987) (analyzing how society would deal with
bankruptcy problems and issues in the absence of bankruptcy law). Whatever the merits
of these studies, they have little to do with the typical one-asset case.
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general kind of method in all the Chapter 11 madness. 47 None of these
analyses seems to have considered the proposition that by leaving things in
a muddle, the statute may be doing exactly what Congress intended to do.
The point of departure is that the motivations of shareholders of a debtladen corporation are different from the motivations of creditors. 8 This is
not a principle of law, but rather a simple matter of arithmetic. The legal
question is how to reconcile these competing interests when the debtor is
wavering between profit and loss.
A superficial review of the facts will cause many readers to favor the
creditors because any other result will permit the debtor to "gamble with
other peoples' money."4 9 This is true in that under Plan I the equity
owners have everything to gain and nothing to lose. But this is too simple.
Where there is a choice between sure compensation for creditors and
nothing for equity on the one hand, versus a credit risk and an equity
opportunity on the other, the creditors will value at naught all of the
debtor's opportunities and pass up risks that ought, in some global sense, to
be taken.5 0
Hasty observers might respond that, because the problem is unanswer-

47. See Korobkin, supranote 3, at 780-82.
48. Early formulations of this principle include Joseph E. Stiglitz, Some Aspects of
the Pure Theory of CorporateFinance:Bankruptcies and Takeovers, 3 BELL J. ECON.
& MGMT. Sci. 458 (1972); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm:ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305, 340 (1976); Jeremy I. Bulow & John B. Shoven, The Bankruptcy Decision, 9 BELL
J. ECON. 437 (1978). In this Article, I treat the interests of managers and residuary
owners as if they are alike. Thus I sidestep the analysis developed in Susan RoseAckerman, Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment Choice, 20 J. LEGAL
STUD. 277 (1991).

49. For a common-sense exposition of the point, see in Lynn M. LoPucki, The
Debtor in Full Control-SystemsFailure Under Chapter11 of the Bankruptcy Code ?(pts.
1 & 2), 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 247 (1983). LoPucki's study is virtually the only
comprehensive review of small Chapter 1is, marred only by his settled antipathy to the
process as he finds it. Cf. Lynn M. LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the
State Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 WIs. L. REv. 311. The ultimate example is In
re Tri-State Paving, 32 B.R. 2 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982), where the principals took the
cash out of the debtor's bank account and went gambling in Las Vegas. The trustee
prevailed in an action against the principals. However, Elizabeth Warren and Jay
Westbrook, in their bankruptcy text, suggest that the principals should have argued that
the "company's prospects were so bleak that a run at the tables was the best investment
alternative remaining." ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF

591 (2d ed. 1982).
50. See, e.g., White, Bankruptcy Decision, supra note 1, at 129 (noting the risk of
too-hasty filing). Concern over too-quick liquidation figures prominently in discussions
of British insolvency law. See, e.g., Creditors Worry About a Quick Sell, FIN. TIMEs,
Sept. 15, 1992, at 15.
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS
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able in principle, this matter is best left to private contract, beyond the
interference of the law. Although the proponent might be able to make her
case on this point, as a matter of practice, the issue has long since been
decided otherwise. For centuries debtor-creditor law has been considered
one of those areas outside the scope of private contract, where the state sets
the rules and the parties cannot vary the terms.51 The best the parties can
do is to take those terms into account in their planning and plan around
them.52 Although the normative question may remain open, the analytical
question is not whether the Bankruptcy Code can restrict the parties on the
facts of this hypothetical, but whether it has. In my view, this question
currently stands unresolved and is not likely to get an early realization. The
interests on each side are so appealing and the arguments (and authorities)
so well entrenched that the best that one can expect is to recognize and
apply them as appropriate.
B. Why the Creditor Should Win
From the creditor's perspective, the whole purpose of bankruptcy is to
liquidate the debtor's estate and distribute it to creditors according to their
interests.53 Yet, Chapter 11 is often considered a debtor-protection
measure. And certainly, some provisions of the Bankruptcy Code must be
justified, if at all, in terms of their benefit to debtors.54 But debtor

51. See U.C.C. § 9-501(3) (1992). The Bankruptcy Code also supplies unavoidable
contract terms. For example, the debtor cannot contract away his power to get a
discharge, no matter how much he wants to. Even accepting state regulation of secured
transactions, still Professor Baird would apparently argue that this is an area where
bankruptcy should not vary state-law rules because doing so would lead to unwholesome
forum shopping. See Baird, supranote 44. Not to dwell on the point at length, but Baird
apparently fails to grasp how many counter-inducements there are to discourage an
enterprise from filing.
52. I accept that there are "costs" incident to this kind of contract regulation and that
someone will bear these costs-perhaps the debtor whom we are trying to protect. But
(ie incidence of the costs is an empirical question that cannot be answered in the
abstract. Those costs they may go "forward" to the debtor in the form of higher prices,
etc., or "backward" to the producer in the form of lower profits. It all depends on the
shape of the relevant supply and demand curves.
53. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1988) (duties of a trustee).
54. Most obvious is the bankruptcy discharge in Chapter 7, where the debtor is
typically an individual dependant on wages who seeks to free up her earning capacity and
wipe out prior debts. 11 U.S.C. § 727. Even here, of course, the argument may be cast
in social terms. For example, one may argue that the discharge has some residual benefit
to society in that society gains from the debtor's renewed motivation. On the other hand,
one may argue that the protection is illusory insofar as debtors as a class bear the burden
of the individual discharge in the form of higher finance charges. This is no place to
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protection is at best a latecomer to the bankruptcy agenda. As a matter of
history, liquidation and distribution long precede debtor protection and
remain the core of any "asset case" under Chapter 7. Furthermore, Chapter
11 certainly can, and often does, serves this function as well. Chapter 11
may have the additional function of preserving going-concern values. 5
This function raises an important point of confusion. Some commentators (and probably many practitioners and judges) believe that there is an
equivalence between preserving going-concern values and preserving the old
equity ownership interest. This is clearly wrong because the business may
continue even after the old equity is cut off. 6 In fact, nothing in Chapter
11 indicates that its ultimate purpose is any different from that of Chapter
757

Next, there is the matter of the so-called debtor-in-possession ("DIP").
In the typical Chapter 11 case, the debtor remains in possession of the estate
assets and has the powers and obligations of a trustee. The presumption for
a DIP is commonly thought of as a debtor-protective device, and its
presence argues against, rather than in favor of, creditor control. However,
this interpretation misconceives the role and responsibility of the DIP. From
the standpoint of legislative purpose, one can identify a rather different
purpose for the DIP: creditor economy. For example, suppose the case of
the truly "honest but unfortunate debtor."" He may have fallen on hard
times, and he may never see daylight in the business again, but he still may
be the person best suited to manage the business efficiently. 9 Thus, it may

pursue all the infinite byways that can be sighted down this road.

55. This is certainly implicit in the notion that the debtor's business may continue to
operate unless the court orders otherwise. II U.S.C. § 1108. But the debtor's business
may continue to operate in Chapter 7, as well. See id. § 721. See generally John D.
Ayer, Dialectic in the CornerPocket, NORTON BANKR. L. ADvISER, Feb. 1991, at 1112.
56. Some readers will concede this may be true for a public company, but argue that
it is not so clear for a private company, where equity and management are one. Even
conceding that there are important functional differences between public and private
companies, still the point in the text stands. If the old equity owner has management
skills that are essential to the continuation of the business, she will certainly have the
opportunity to be retained as an employee. Absent a better offer, she will likely accept

employment by the debtor, however inferior it may be to the opportunity to participate
as equity.
57. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1106, 1107. Indeed, Chapter 11 specifically provides for
conversion or dismissal for "unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to
creditors." Id. § 1112(b)(3).
58. This phrase is from Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
59. This seems to be the burden of 11 U.S.C. § 1104, especially § 1104(a)(1)
(providing that a trustee may be appointed "for cause including fraud, dishonesty,
incompetence, or gross mismanagement"). In the absence of fraud, etc., the appointment
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be better for everyone, not least the creditors, that the debtor remain in
control throughout the liquidation or transition.
Under this analysis, the DIP is nothing more than a species of
trustee.' There is plenty of authority for the proposition that management
of an insolvent entity owes to creditors a fiduciary obligation in bankruptcy, 6' and even out of bankruptcy.6' In addition, there is some authority
that the principle holds even when the entity is not, strictly speaking, insolvent. 6 Familiar commentary also supports this view. 61

of a trustee would not be appropriate. But even this section is amenable to multiple
readings. Thus, the negative inference from § 1104(a)(1) might be that it is better for
creditors to leave the debtor in possession in the absence of fraud, etc; or the inference
might be that the debtor is being offered the opportunity to remain in possession as an
inducement to encourage her to avoid fraud, etc.
60. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104.
61. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343
(1985); In re Sky Valley, Inc., 135 B.R. 925 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992); Committee of
Creditors of Xonics Med. Sys., Inc. v. Haverty (In re Xonics, Inc.), 99 B.R. 870, 872
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
62. See, e.g., FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 928 (1983); Automatic Canteen Co. of Am. v. Wharton (In re Continental
Vending Mach. Corp.), 358 F.2d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1966); In re Baldwin-United Corp.,
43 B.R. 443, 459 n.22 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Lilly v. Ernst, 113 F. Supp. 178, 181 (S.D.
W. Va. 1952); Northern Bank v. Metropolitan Cosmetic & Reconstructive Surgical
Clinic, P.A. (In re Metropolitan Cosmetic & Reconstructive Surgical Clinic, P.A.), 115
B.R. 185 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990); Henderson v. Buchanan (In re Western World
Funding, Inc.), 52 B.R. 743, 763 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
131 B.R. 859 (D. Nev. 1990), rev'd, 985 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1993); Francis v. United
Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981). Strictly speaking, the rule that the trustee is a
fiduciary for creditors is no more than a subset of a general rule that the managers of the
enterprise are fiduciaries for residual owners. See generally Albert H. Barkey, The
FinancialArticulation of a Fiduciary Duty to Bondholders with Fiduciary Duties to
Stockholders of the Corporation,20 CREIGHTON L. REv. 47 (1986); William W. Bratton,
Jr., The Interpretationof ContractsGoverningCorporateDebtRelationships,5 CARDozo
L. REV. 371 (1984); William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal
Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92; William W. Bratton Jr., The
Economics andJurisprudenceof Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 667; Morey W.
McDaniel, Bondholders and CorporateGovernance, 41 BUs. LAW. 413 (1986); Morey
W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. LAw. 205 (1987).
63. Davis v. Woolf, 147 F.2d 629, 633 (4th Cir. 1945):
"The law by the great weight of authority seems to be settled that when a
corporation becomes insolvent, or in a failing condition, the officers and
directors no longer represent the stockholders, but by the fact of insolvency,
become trustees for the creditors, and that they cannot by transfer of its
property or payment of cash, prefer themselves or other creditors . ..."
(emphasis added) (quoting Arnold v. Knap, 84 S.E. 895, 899 (W. Va. 1915)).
64. See, e.g., Michael Cook & Carolyn Schwartz, At a Troubled Company, Officers
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These arguments have a ring of familiarity about them; however,
perhaps none of these arguments is conclusive, as shall be seen in reviewing
the case against creditor control.
C. Why the Debtor Should Win
As plausible as these arguments for favoring creditors may be, there are
a number of other arguments that seem to meet and virtually offset them.
And these counter-arguments are not merely matters of judicial gloss; they
are built into the structure of the statute itself. Thus, "Chapter 11 is not the
flip of the coin, in football; it is the serve, in tennis." 65 Or, less poetically,
there are provisions in the statute itself that count as a "tilt to the debtor."
Perhaps the most obvious "tilt to the debtor" in Chapter 11 is the socalled "exclusivity period," which provides in the typical case that the
prebankruptcy managers get the first shot at formulating a plan.66 The
importance of the exclusivity period is apparent upon analysis of the
motivations and the possibilities of the parties in a simple case. If the
creditor had its way, the creditor would simply propose a plan calling for
some sort of transfer of the old entity to new ownership. If there were
insufficient funds to satisfy all claims, as would almost always be the
case,67 then the old residuary owners would be wiped out. A transfer might
be by some sort of auction sale, by more extensive marketing, or by credit
bid at a foreclosure, depending on what served the creditor's interest; or,
the transfer might be a piecemeal liquidation. In principle, it might just as
well be a sale in place as a going concern. 6 The point is that none of this
helps the old equity owners, and no such plan will be proposed as long as
the old equity is in charge.
and Directors Owe CreditorsFirst, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 16, 1987, at 22.

65. I heard this metaphor several years ago from George Treister in one of his
bankruptcy update programs.
66. Unless the court orders otherwise, the debtor has 120 days in which to formulate
a plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1988). For a useful review of early exclusivity cases, see
Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 43.
67. See, e.g., Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Lake in the Woods (In re
Lake in the Woods), 10 B.R. 338 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (holding that a request for
extension should not be used as leverage in any dispute with creditors). Such a holding
is not inconsistent with the idea that the basic exclusivity period is itself leverage in the
dispute with creditors.
68. See Bruce A. Markell, The Case Against Breakup Fees in Bankruptcy, 66 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 349 (1992) (arguing that the superior title awarded a buyer in a bankruptcy
purchase is one of the signal advantages of taking the debtor through the bankruptcy
court). Professor Jackson treats the sale to creditors as the essence of a Chapter 11 case;
however, this position is qualified his later work, where he questions whether Chapter
11 has any distinctive purpose at all. See JACKSON, supra note 2.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/7
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Then there is the matter of the DIP. In the previous section, I sketched
the proposition that the DIP was only a species of trustee. But this is at best
a half-truth. Conceding that retention of the DIP may sometimes serve the
interests of creditors, still it is unlikely in the extreme that Congress
intended this to be the only reason for favoring the DIP. Indeed, there is
another quite different, and perhaps more visible, justification for the
retention of the DIP. The most obvious, and for present purposes the most
important, is that the DIP scheme gives the old equity practical control and
a chance to structure the case for its own advantage. 69
Another statutory basis for positing a "tilt to equity" is the provision
in the Code for an equity committee. Although equity committees are rare,
and there is no fully articulated rationale for their place in the Code,7" the
only conceivable purpose for equity committees seems to be to enhance the
chances of residuary owner participation in the reorganization.
There is a final statutory point, perhaps not so momentous, but still
worth attention. This is the matter of the exercise of the avoiding powers.
A number of courts have found an operational difference between the trustee
and the DIP, holding that the statute of limitations binding trustees in such
cases does not run during the incumbency of a DIP. 7
Moreover, there may be less than meets the eye in the notion that a DIP
69. This can be inferred at least from the rule on the exclusivity period: The period
may be terminated at any time on a proper showing; but it terminates in any event when
the court appoints a trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (1988). There is a third, perhaps
subsidiary, reason for the DIP that serves both debtors and creditors. If the manager of
a troubled business knows that she will not be ousted from possession merely by filing
a petition under Chapter 11, she will be more willing to do so when it is needed than she
would be otherwise. Martin Bienenstock pointed this out to me in conversation.
70. Notable case discussions include: Committee of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel
Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983) (discussing sale of estate
property); In re Heck's Inc., 83 B.R. 410 (S.D. W. Va. 1988) (reversing denial of
motion to retain counsel); Albero v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.)
68 B.R. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (concluding that appointment of committee was not an
abuse of discretion), appeal dismissed, 824 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1987); Bank Creditors
Group v. Hamill (In re White Motor Credit Corp.), 27 B.R. 554 (N.D. Ohio 1982)
(discussing composition of committee); In re Heck's, Inc., 112 B.R. 775 (Bankr. S.D.
W. Va. 1990) (reviewing fees of equity committee), aff'd in part,rev'd in part, 151 B.R.
739 (S.D. W. Va. 1992); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Int'l,
Inc. v. Mellon Bank, N.A. (In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc.), 93 B.R. 903 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1988) (restricting intervention by equity committee), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 107
B.R. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Penn-Dixie, Indus., 9 B.R. 941 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1981) (discussing membership on committee and debtor's standing to challenge
committee).
71. See, e.g., Pullman Constr. Indus. v. National Steel Serv. Ctr. (In re Pullman
Constr. Indus.), 132 B.R. 359 (Bankr. N.D. 111.1991) (citing and discussing cases on
both sides of the issue).
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has the obligations of a fiduciary. Concededly, the statement appears in
many cases; but at best, "fiduciary" is one of those terms that subsist at a
high level of abstraction where they can float free and unimpeded of any
binding content.72 And on close scrutiny, the cases cited by the creditors
on that issue seem to stand for less than the creditors want. Almost
universally, those cases involve situations of direct self-dealing between the
debtor and residuary owners or between the debtor and his close allies-cases, in other words, of fraudulent transfer that have little or nothing
to do with management's power to put estate assets at risk.
The following hypothetical suggests just how slippery the fiduciary
issue may be:
Alice, an attorney, was counsel to David, the debtor-in-possession,
in a Chapter 11 case where a principal asset was David's farm. The
farm was subject to a security interest held by Newbank securing a loan
of $1 million. David's parents offered to buy the farm for $700,000.
Following Alice's instructions, David retained a real estate agent to see
if the property would yield a better price. After diligent efforts (national
advertising, etc.), the agent reported that he could find no one willing
to pay more than $700,000 for the property. Alice thereupon petitioned
the court for permission to sell the property out of the ordinary course
of business (see 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1988)) to David's parents for
$700,000. She gave notice of all these facts to all creditors, including
Newbank. No one requested a hearing, and the property was sold to
David's parents, who paid $700,000 cash to David as DIP. The
proceeds were distributed to Newbank.
Three months later, David secured an order discharging his liability
on all claims, including Newbank's $300,000 deficiency claim. The
estate was then closed. Six months later, David's parents sold the
property to David's next-door neighbor, Newt, for $1.2 million. The
parents kept $700,000 for themselves and paid over the $500,000
balance to David.
On further inquiry, Newbank learned that Newt had first offered to
buy the property for $1.2 million just three weeks before the bankruptcy
case began. The deal had fallen through, apparently because David
could not deliver clean title. Newt had thereupon invested his money
elsewhere and lost interest in David's property. But later, his other
investments having prospered, he approached David's parents about
reopening negotiations, and this deal was the result.

72. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,
1988 DuKE L.J. 879, 879. For the classic formulation of the role of the director, see
Harold Marsh, Jr., Are DirectorsTrustees? Conflict of Interest and CorporateMorality,
22 Bus. LAW. 35 (1966); see also John M. Olson, The FiduciaryDuties of Insurgent
Boards, 47 Bus. LAW. 1011 (1992).
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This is a slightly stylized version of In re Schipper,73 which I have
been presenting over the past couple of years in panel discussions on
professional responsibility for lawyers. Although I have not kept precise
score, my strong impression is that my auditors generally tend to be
unsympathetic to the position of the debtor in this case and conclude that the
proceeds of the second sale should somehow flow to the estate. But in fact,
three courts-the bankruptcy court, the district court on appeal, and a threejudge panel of the circuit court-all denied the relief.74
The Schipper case, particularly the Seventh Circuit opinion, is
remarkable not so much for its result as for its reasoning. The courts might
have held for the defendants by concluding that the aggrieved creditor
suffered no actual harm (though this conclusion is questionable). But the
circuit court went further and sought to define a general principle governing
the fiduciary duty of a DIP in a Chapter 11 case. The court recognized that
two fiduciary duties were possibly relevant here: (1) the "general fiduciary
duty" to creditors or the "corporate fiduciary" duty standard;75 and (2) the
"high standard of duty applied in the common law to trustees. "76 The court
assumed, arguendo, that Schipper's nondisclosure would have been culpable
had he labored under the "higher standard" applied to a common-law
fiduciary. However, the court found that there was no such duty, and hence,
no liability. Indeed, the circuit court pointed more strongly, stating that "the
Bank fails to cite to a single case in which a court has applied the trustee
standard to a debtor in possession. That is because there are none."'77
As an understanding of the role of the DIP, the court of appeals
decision in Schipper is atrocious. If the court found the caselaw somehow
deficient on the topic, it may be because it is the statute, not the case law,
that imposes on the DIP the duties of a trustee. 7' And, as discussed earlier,
the statutory rule itself is innocuous; it is merely a special case of a more
general rule that managers of any entity owe a fiduciary obligation to
residuary owners, no matter who the residuary owners might be.
This general managerial duty includes, in virtually any case, the duty
of loyalty, including the duty to avoid self-dealing except in highly restricted
circumstances based on exhaustive disclosure.79 Similar principles hold
73. Fulton State Bank v. Schipper (In re Schipper), 109 B.R. 832 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1989), aff'd, 112 B.R. 917 (N.D. Ill.
1990), aft'd, 933 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1991).

74. Schipper, 109 B.R. at 837-38; 112 B.R. at 920; 933 F.2d at 515-16.
75. Schipper, 933 F.2d at 515.
76. Id. at 516.
77. Id.
78. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1988).
79. See generally David S. Ruder, Duty of Loyalty-A Law Professor's Status
Report, 40 Bus. LAW. 1383 (1985) ("[T]he principles are easy to state in general terms
but may be difficult to apply."); Marsh, supra note 72.
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under the law of trusts, where there is authority that self-dealing is
impermissible altogether.8" Other formulations are more tolerant, permitting self-dealing, for example, where there is adequate disclosure together
with a show of substantive fairness.A'
Of course it is possible that the court of appeals in Schipper, on sober
consideration of the facts in context, concluded that the self-dealing in this
case was proper. But having so badly mishandled the conceptual framework,
it is vain to speculate on just how it might have gone about the job.
On this score at least, Judge DeGunther's opinion for the bankruptcy
court represents a vast improvement. Judge DeGunther held, at least
implicitly, that if there had been a covert side deal between the debtor, the
parents, and the neighbor, then some sort of action would be in order.
However, finding on inquiry that there was no such option, Judge
DeGunther treats his work as done.'
This approach is not discreditable, but it seems to confuse two kinds of
inquiry. One is the possibility of an under-the-table deal, which Judge
DeGunther considered and ruled on. The other issue, which was not
discussed, is the question of what, if anything, the creditor might have done
had it known of the prior offer. It seems entirely likely that the creditor
would have acted differently. For example, the creditor might have gone to
the "once and future buyer" and sought to reopen negotiations on the spot,
while the property was still property of the estate. Short of this, the creditor
might at least have taken a long, critical look at his own appraisal, to
determine why it did not reflect the possible third-party bid. None of these
measures is possible, however, as long as the creditor languishes in
ignorance.
Finally, even accepting that the debtor had no definite knowledge that
the neighbor would reappear, it seems virtually certain that the debtor and
the parents must have entertained the possibility, thereby giving them a
motivation to get the property out of the estate and park it with the parents
on a hope and a prayer, independent of any enforceable obligation. Although
this "hope and a prayer" cannot really count as a balance-sheet asset, it
seems precisely the sort of thing that a concerned creditor might want to
know.
Taken in this light, Schipper clearly represents a godsend to counsel for
DIPs. We are bound to hear more of it in the future as DIPs and their

80. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS § 170 (1959); see also UNIP.
PROBATE CODE § 3-713, 8 U.L.A. 331 (1983). See generally Joel C. Dobris, Equitable
Adjustments in Postmortem Income Tax Planning:An Unremitting Diet of Warms, 65

IOWA L. REv. 103 (1979).
81. See. e.g, UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-713, 8 U.L.A. 331 (1983).
82. See Schipper, 109 B.R. at 834.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/7
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counsel try to protect themselves and their assets against claims of creditors.
Out of the infinite possible occasions for discussion on one-asset cases,
only a few can be treated in this Article. Perhaps the most interesting is In
re Lionel Corp.' Lionel's most important asset was an eighty-two percent
interest in Dale, a solvent corporation not part of Lionel's Chapter 11 case.
Lionel, as DIP, proposed to sell the stock under 11 U.S.C. § 363 for $50
million. The creditors' committee recommended the sale, but the shareholders objected. The shareholders argued that sale under section 363 sidestepped the process of plan, disclosure, and confirmation and deprived the
estate of an asset that might be "the cornerstone for a sound plan."" The
bankruptcy court and the district court had allowed the sale. The court of
appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the bankruptcy judge must
"articulate sound business justifications for his decisions";5 otherwise the
objecting shareholders should prevail. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Ralph
K. Winter said that the equity holders' arguments were "the legal equivalent
of the 'Hail Mary pass' in football."8 6
Several comments about Lionel are in order.87 Most important for our
purposes, Lionel may not stand for anything at all about a "tilt toward the
debtor." It may be simply an opinion about the plan process and the attempt
to bypass the plan process via section 363. Such an opinion would hardly
be outlandish. There is indeed a good deal of question about how far one
can use section 363 to violate the plan process. 8 If that is all Lionel stands

83. Committee of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722
F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983).
84. Id. at 1066.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1072 (Winter, J., dissenting).
87. Although only marginally relevant to the main line of the argument set forth
here, I cannot let the opportunity pass without noting that Lionel gives powerful evidence
of what seems to be an increasing problem in bankruptcy-the amateurish quality of the
opinion-writing (perhaps as distinct from the results) of appellate (as distinct from trial)
courts in the bankruptcy arena. Whatever its substantive virtue, Lionel seems to have
been drafted not by a judge, nor even by a law clerk, but rather by a third-year law
student taking a semester away from law school in lieu of taking a bankruptcy course.
More precisely, it seems to be an opinion by a person who fears that he will never get
another chance to write an opinion and thereby has to throw everything he knows into
this one (much like the feeling you get about movie-making from Jean-Jacques Beineix's
direction of Diva).
88. See, e.g., Institutional Creditors of Continental Air Lines v. Continental Air
Lines (In re Continental Air Lines), 780 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1986); Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc., (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d 935 (5th
Cir. 1983); Walter v. Sunwest Bank (In re Walter), 83 B.R. 14 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1988);
In re Public Serv. Co., 90 B.R. 575 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988); In re Naron & Wagner, 88
B.R. 85 (Bankr. D. Md. 1988).
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for, then it is not terribly contentious.
A final point about Lionel: the "'Hail Mary' pass" connected: The
estate later sold the property for $76 million-more than half again as much
as the original bid. 9
A somewhat more equivocal approach to the problem of equity control
comes from the celebrated (or infamous) Johns-Manville case. I Both
equity and debt may find solace in the somewhat oracular pronouncement
of the Second Circuit here. Management was negotiating with creditors for
a plan, and the shareholders decided that management was giving away too
much. Accordingly, the shareholders undertook to oust management, with
the hope of getting a more aggressive successor. The bankruptcy court
enjoined the shareholders' action by summary judgment. On appeal, the
Second Circuit reversed and remanded, for "a more elaborate inquiry into
clear abuse and irreparable harm. Rather than focusing on the
[shareholders'] conceded desire to enhance its bargaining position, the court
should analyze the real risks to rehabilitation." 9
In other words, the shareholders hold a place at the table, even in a
case where equity was, by all appearances, under water. 92 The Manville
court imposed one seemingly important limitation on the shareholders'
arsenal of possible motivations. Specifically, the court said that the
shareholders could pressure management as "a bargaining chip in the aid of
negotiation," but they could not act "to 'torpedo' the reorganization." 9'
The court stated: "Unless the Equity Committee were to bargain in bad
faith-e.g., to demonstrate a willingness to risk rehabilitation altogether in
order to win a large share for equity-its desire to negotiate for a larger
share is protected. "I The difficulty here, of course, is that it is unclear just
what other weapon the equity might have. If they cannot be obstructionist,
no one needs to pay any attention to them.
In summary, it seems clear that the drafters of the Code intended that
there be some leeway for the old residuary owners to maneuver the case for
their own benefit. Even more to the point, it seems clear that bankruptcy
judges commonly, if not universally, understand Chapter 11 as a device for
giving old equity a second chance. 95 As a matter of legislative intent, it is
89. CharterhouseCompletesAcquisitionforMezzanine,PR NEwsWPRE, Nov. 1, 1985
(available on LEXIS).
90. Manville Corp. v. Equity See. Holders Comm. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.),
801 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1986).

91. Id. at 69.
92. Some of the valuation difficulties in Manville are set forth in LoPucki &
Whitford, BargainingOver Equity's Share, supra note 46.
93. Manville, 801 F.2d at 64.

94. Id. at 65.
95. Nimmer and Feinberg identify three factors that "capture[ ] a large majority of
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/7
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not clear that these bankruptcy judges are wrong. An observer with an
instinct for order might regard this situation as a kind of legislative
solecism, crying out for congressional action to clarify the sovereign's
mandate. However, such an interpretation misses the point of this Article,
which is that Congress may have intended the structure of Chapter 11 to be
muddy, precisely to avoid solving a problem that it did not wish to solve.
I suggested earlier that I wanted to limit myself to more or less
conventional strategies of statutory construction, rather than ascend to the
more rarified heights of theory. But one case presents a point of what might
pass for theory in a context so novel and compelling that it demands brief
notice here. The case is In re Central Ice Cream Co. ,96 decided by the
Seventh Circuit in 1987. Central's only asset was a trial court judgment
against McDonald's for $52 million, subject to appeal. General creditors'
claims were $11 million. McDonald's offered to settle with Central for $15
million during the pendency of the appeal. Not surprisingly, the creditors
wanted to take the money and run. They could never do any better, and they
could easily do worse. But, as is equally unsurprising, the shareholders
wanted to reject the settlement. Their residuary share of the settlement
would be only $4 million; risking $4 million to get more than $40 million
looked like pretty good odds.
Although the issue of trustee responsibility did not present itself
squarely in the Seventh Circuit, Judge Frank Easterbrook nevertheless took
the occasion to expound his views on the issue. He stated:
[The trustee's] duty is to maximize the value of the estate, not of a
particular group of claimants. ... It is true, as the bankruptcy judge

wrote, that spurning the settlement would expose the creditors to risk,
but this parallels the risk creditors face outside of the bankruptcy97
process as firms try to maximize the expected value of the enterprise.
Easterbrook was arguing for what is elsewhere identified as "global
wealth maximization." 9 This argument sounds innocuous enough until you
think it through. It suggests that the trustee owes a primary duty neither to
debt nor to equity, but rather that he should manage the asset pool as if the

all cases appointing a trustee [i.e., ousting the DIP] for cause": (1) reporting and recordkeeping failure; (2) management incompetence; and (3) self-dealing in the sense of
spiriting assets out of the estate. Interestingly, none of these has anything to do with
honest, competent risk-taking in the management of the asset pool. See Nimmer &
Feinberg, supra note 43, at 56-57.
96. 836 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1987).
97. Id. at 1072. For more background on the presettlement negotiations, see In re
Ice Cream Co., 114 B.R. 956 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
98. See, e.g., articles cited supra note 62.
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company were financed entirely with equity. This concept is perhaps a
natural outgrowth of modem financial theory." Attractive though this may
be as a general principle of management, most lawyers were brought up to
believe something very different: the traditional wisdom that management
owes something like a fiduciary duty to equity, 1' ° while it deals with debt
at arm's length."'0 Easterbrook's proposition seems to suggest that the
claims of each constituency are equal.
IV. NEW VALUE

In explicating the problem of the one-asset case, it would be useful to
examine a number of sub-issues that have helped either to illuminate or
complicate the debate. These issues include the classification of claims," 2

99. Two strains of modem financial theory in particular are implicated. One is the
Modigliani-Miller thesis, which teaches that assets and liabilities are fundamentally
independent of each other, and the asset side of the balance sheet cannot be changed by
manipulating the liability side. See, e.g., Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The
Cost of Capital, CorporationFinance and the Theory of Investment, AM. ECON. REV.
261 (1958); Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, Reply to Heins and Springle, 59
AM. ECON. REv. 592 (1969). At least in this rendering, the thesis sounds innocuous
enough that it is probably hard for a younger reader to imagine why anyone would think
it controversial.
The other theory is that the corporation is nothing but a nexus of contracts. See,
e.g., Armin A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Steven N.S. Cheung, The
ContractualNature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1983); Eugene F. Fama, Agency
Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Eugene F. Fama
& Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301
(1983); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 48, at 343-51.
100. "Typically, state law provides that a company's board of directors owes a
fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the corporation and/or the corporation." Davis et
al., supra note 43, at 2 (emphasis added). The Davis article seems to presuppose a
primary duty to shareholders, but what can be the meaning of the phrase in italics?. The
idea of the primacy of equity seems to underlie most of the important finance literature,
as well. See, e.g., Stewart C. Myers, Determinantsof CorporateBorrowing, 5 J. FIN.
ECON. 147 (1977).
101. For an argument from a somewhat different standpoint for a fiduciary duty to
bondholders, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, The FairnessRights of CorporateBondholders,
65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1990). Mitchell's article contains a helpful bibliography of
earlier discussions, id. at 1169 n.11; see also Andrew E. Bogen et al., Landmarks on an
Unmapped Terrain:Defining the Rights of Debtholders, PRENTICE HALL L. & Bus.
INSIGHTS, Jan, 1991, at 19; Cook & Schwartz, supra note 64, at 22.
102. The point here is that in order to confirm a plan, the court must find that there
is at least one consenting class. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (1988). In a one-asset case, the
dominant creditor by definition opposes the plan. The trick is to manufacture a class that
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the allocation of rents and profits," ° and the applicability of the section
1111(b) option."° To keep this Article manageable, however, I will
bypass these other topics and concentrate on what seems to be the essential
sub-issue in the one-asset case: that Olympian among bankruptcy puzzles,
the so-called "new value" problem. I have unburdened myself before on the
topic of "new value," 5 and, although my basic position has not changed,
there are several reasons for rehashing the matter here. First, the understanding of the topic has grown through a number of valuable scholarly
contributions,' together with some court decisions.1"7 But still, to my
mind, nobody has gotten it quite right.
The problem is easily stated. Suppose a plan proponent10 8 wants the

will accept the plan, without being found culpable of impermissible gerrymandering. The
argument would be that the gerrymandering cases are almost always driven by the court's
sympathy with, or hostility to, the underlying plan. Happily, David Gray Carlson is
dealing with that issue at length elsewhere in this Symposium. See David G. Carlson,
The Classification Veto in Single-Asset Cases Under Bankruptcy Code Section
1129(a)(10), 44 S.C. L. Rv. 565 (1993).
103. See, e.g., Sarah H. Reynolds, A New Look at Secured Creditors'Rights to Rents
and Profits: Is the Pendulum Swinging Back?, 15 CEB REAL PROP. L. REP. 257 (1992).
Once again, the argument would be that the characterization of rents and profits tends
to get subsumed in the larger question of the propriety of a one-asset case.
104. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b). The 1111(b) option is particularly intriguing in light of the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S.Ct. 773 (1992). Some
observers have suggested that the Court's reasoning in Dewsnup v. Timm makes the
1111(b) election unnecessary. See, e.g., Alan P. Woodruff, Lien Stripping in Chapter
7 Bankruptcy After Dewsnup v. Timm, 66 FLA. B.J. 31 (1992). Although on the face of
things, this is a plausible reading of Dewsnup v. Timm, I suspect that as a practical
matter it will not work out that way.
105. John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute PriorityAfter Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REv. 963
(1989).
106. See, e.g., Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, BargainingAfter the Fall and the
Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. Cin. L. REv. 738 (1988); Bruce A.
Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44
STAN. L. REv. 69 (1991); Elizabeth Warren, A Theory of Absolute Priority, 1991 ANN.

SuRv. AM. L. 9; James J. White, Absolute Priorityand New Value, 8 T.M. COOLEY L.
REv. 1 (1991); see also Daniel M. Powlen & Arnold H. Wuhrman, The New Value
Exception to the Absolute PriorityRule: Is Ahlers the Beginning of the End?, 93 CoM.
L.J. 303 (1988); Ralph A. Peeples, Staying In: Chapter 11, Close Corporationsand the
Absolute Priority Rule, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65, 77 (1989); Raymond T. Nimmer,

Negotiated Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Absolute priority and New Value
Contributions, 36 EMORY L.J. 1009 (1987).

107. See cases cited infra notes 113-115.
108. Typically the plan proponent is the debtor, or the residuary owners of the debtor,
but not always. Creditors may also propose plans in some cases. On the other hand,
debtor cramdowns will almost always need some sort of new-value component; creditor
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court to confirm a plan that proposes to pay less than 100% of the claims
of some class. Confirmation is proper, of course, if the class consents. 9
However, the proponent may win confirmation even without consent (i.e.,
"cram down"), but with a catch. The catch is that no junior claim or interest
may receive or retain any property on account of such junior claim or interest-the "absolute priority rule." The typical junior class is the class of
equity holders. Equity interests have repeatedly sought to evade (or cabin,
depending on your analysis) the cram-down limitation by proposing to pick
up the residuary ownership in exchange for "new value."
The so-called "new value rule""' allegedly arose as a gloss on pre1978 reorganization law."' The rule (if there is one) is apparently not
restricted to one-asset cases, although it frequently arises in them and may
be pivotal to their success. In 1988 the Supreme Court was invited to hold
that this "exception" had been "overruled" by the 1978 Bankruptcy Code,
but the Court explicitly refused."' Since then any number of cases have
endorsed,"' rejected,"' or questioned'' the rule; however, as a mat-

cramdowns almost never do.

109. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1988).
110. As will be set forth more fully below, the adversaries on this issue cannot even
agree on whether "new value" counts as a "rule" or an "exception" to a rule. I call it
a rule here for convenience only, trusting that I will not prejudge the result.
111. See Case v.Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939). Case is often
treated as if it involved Chapter X of the old Bankruptcy Act; in fact, it involved its
predecessor, § 77B. But by the time Case was decided, Chapter X was already in force,
and everyone has always assumed that Case's validity was not affected by the statutory
change. In an earlier article, I suggested that the new-value rule was an illusion under
the old Code in that no case ever actually applied it. See Ayer, supra note 105, at 1016.
In the same vein, Judge Frank Easterbrook says that new value was "100% dicta" under
the Act. Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 909 F.2d 1351, 1360 (7th Cir.
1990). Randy Haines argues that the principle was, in fact supported by Ecker v.
Western Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 448, 485-87 (1943) (section 77), and Mason v. Paradise
Irr. Dist. 326 U.S. 536, 541-43 (1946) (Chapter XI).
112. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 203 n.3 (1988).
113. See, e.g., Bonner Mall Partnership v. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. (In re Bonner
Mall Partnership), 2 F.3d 899, 906-18 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S.Ct. 681
(1994); Carson Nugget, Inc. v. Green (In re Green), 98 B.R. 981, 982 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1989); In re Sovereign Group 1985-27, Ltd., 142 B.R. 702, 706 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Penn
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Woodscape Ltd. Partnership (In re Woodscape Ltd. Partnership),
134 B.R. 165, 168, 175 (Bankr. D. Md. 1991); In re TallahasseeAssocs., 132 B.R. 712,
717 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991); In re 222 Liberty Assocs., 108 B.R. 971, 983 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1990); In re Pullman Constr. Indus., 107 B.R. 909, 945 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1989).
114. See, e.g., Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d
1274, 1284 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 72 (1992); Piedmont Assocs. v.
Cigna Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 132 B.R. 75, 79 (N.D. Ga. 1991); In re A.V.B.I.,
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/7

30

Ayer: Bankruptcy as an Essentially Contested Concept: The Case of the O

1993]

ONE-ASSET CASE

ter of final authority, the question today remains open. " I
On close scrutiny of the cases, it appears that there is not one newvalue rule, but two. One is the matter of whether the old equity owners may
buy the property when there is no higher bidder. The other is the question
whether equity can buy the property in the absence of bidding. A moment's
reflection will suggest that these are two different propositions and that they
can be justified, if at all, on entirely different principles. With a couple of
exceptions to be noted below, this distinction does not seem to have figured
in the literature up to now, but the cases look a lot differprominently
11 7
ent.
To clarify the point, it is useful to examine In re Jartran,Inc., " ' an

Inc., 143 B.R. 738, 742-43 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992); In re Outlook/Century Ltd., 127
B.R. 650, 656 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991); In re Lumber Exch. Ltd. Partnership, 125 B.R.
1000, 1008 (Bankr. D. Minn.), aff'd, 134 B.R. 354 (D. Minn. 1991), aff'd, 968 F.2d
647 (8th Cir. 1992).
115. In re Snyder, 967 F.2d 1126, 1128-31 (7th Cir. 1992); Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Bryson Properties, XVIII (In re Bryson Properties, XVIII), 961 F.2d 496, 503-05 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 191 (1992); Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First
Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1361 (7th Cir. 1990); see also In re E. I. Parks No. 1 Ltd.
Partnership, 122 B.R. 549, 557-58 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1990) (concluding that plan was
too vague and that issue would be determined in the context of a modified plan, if
necessary).
116. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to a Ninth Circuit case that
endorsed the new-value exception to the absolute priority rule. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage
Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 114S. Ct. 681 (1994), grantingcert. to2 F.3d 899 (9th
Cir. 1993). Perhaps the Court will provide some definitive guidance on this troublesome
issue.
117. Others have attempted to subdivide the new-value issue, but not in precisely the
same way that is set forth here. Baird and Jackson, for example, distinguish between
two-party and three-party cases. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 106. David A. Skeel
argues that the absolute priority rule and the new-capital exception may be viewed as
surrogates for two different interests: protection of creditors' rights, and the need for
successful reorganization. See Skeel, supra note 6. Reformulated, the point would be that
the court's tolerance of new value is a function of which of those interests it sees as
paramount. In an important article, Professor Warren argues in favor of letting the old
equity buy the property when there is no higher bidder. See Warren, supranote 106. She
introduces some stimulating perspectives drawn from issues that have arisen with regard
to self-dealing among managers of solvent corporations. But there is no suggestion that
these issues have figured in the debate over new value in bankruptcy. And Professor
Warren virtually ignores the fact that many or most of the new-value cases do not
involve open bidding. Other useful discussions include Markell, supra note 106, at 96
(describing rule as a "catachresis"), Kenneth N. Klee, Cram Down II, 64 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 229 (1990); James H. Franklin et al., Survey: Absolute Priorityand the Continued
Vitality of the "New Value Exception", 1 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 591 (1992).
118. 44 B.R. 331 (Bankr. N.D. 111.1984).
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early and important "new value" case under the Code. In Jartran, the
debtor had apparently run into financial trouble. Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc.
(Hall) bought most of Jartran's equity on credit and filed for Chapter 11
relief the same day. Hall ran the company for over three years before Judge
Fisher confirmed the third modification of the debtor's fifth plan, under
which Hall proposed to retain all the equity in exchange for cash and some
commitments, although creditors would not be paid in full. Judge Fisher
made many findings in his 80-page opinion, but perhaps the most important
is that, although the debtor had engaged in a "thorough marketing effort ....
[n]o viable offers materialized other than that of Hall."119
Having waded through 50 pages of text, the patient reader may be
excused for asking why anyone could possibly object to Hall's plan; the
choice seemed to be Hall's plan or no plan at all. Judge Fisher does not
specifically answer this question, but one can infer an answer from the face
of the opinion. The objecting creditor was U-Haul, a competitor rental
company who almost certainly stood to profit from Jartran's demise. Judge
Fisher seems to have said, in effect, that U-Haul would not be able to scotch
an otherwise viable plan merely to gain a competitive advantage. This rule
seems particularly plausible in a case like Jartran, where there are other
interests at stake.
A similar situation existed in In re U.S. Truck Co., 2 ' where the
adversary was an arm of the Teamsters Union. The court seems to have
taken for granted that no one else wanted the company at any price,
although the court made no specific finding on this point. The old owners
undertook to contribute $100,000, which the court found to be sufficient for
its "new" interest. Once again, the real question is: why should the creditor
object if the old owners were the highest available bidders? And once again,
the answer seems to be that the objecting creditor had an interest aside from
its interest on the face of the contract. Although the court does not spell out
the point in full, it does declare that "rejection will benefit [the Union's]
members in the ongoing employment relationship.""' Apparently, the
Union hoped to use rejection as leverage to reinstate it collective bargaining
agreement with the debtor."2 This inference gets further support later in
the opinion when the court considered the possibility that, postconfirmation,
the debtor may divert business to a sister company and thus eliminate

119. Id. at 381.

120. Teamsters Nat'l Freight Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. U.S. Truck Co. (In re
U.S. Truck Co.), 800 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1986).
121. Id. at 587.
122. This inference gains support from the more thorough account of the facts in the
opinion of the district court, In re U.S. Truck Co., 47 B.R. 932, 937 (E.D. Mich.
1985), aft'd, 800 F.2d 581.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/7
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jobs."u Moreover, in discussing the feasibility of the plan, the court
remarked, "If [the union workers] are truly concerned about feasibility, they
are also able to help achieve it."24

In re Potter Material Service, Inc.I is also in this vein, albeit not so
clearly. Again, the critical fact seems to have been that there was no
competing bidder, hence no one willing to pay more than the old equity
owner. The difference between Potter, on the one hand, and Jartranand
U.S. Truck, on the other, is that there is no suggestion as to why the
creditors in Potter might be willing to risk torpedoing the case. On closer
scrutiny, it appears that they had no such interest; rather, they seem merely
to have been trying to squeeze out a higher valuation. If the creditors had
won, they would have nonetheless settled with the old equity owners,
thereby allowing equity's continued participation for a higher stake.126
Another case that fits this category is In re Star City Rebuilders,
Inc., 27 where the court said that the residual owner might retain the
equity because it had "no value." On its face, this determination seems
indefensible: if the equity has no value, why would the old owners go to
court to claim it? Indeed, the Supreme Court has since expressed its
disapproval of the "no value" analysis, Justice White expressing himself
with something close to impatience.12 But on a second look, Justice White
may have spoken to quickly; reformulated, the "no value" point may have
more viability than may appear at first blush. Dotting a few I's and crossing
a few T's, one could interpret Judge Pearson's opinion in Star City as saying
that the equity had no value to anyone else. In other words, the old equity
owners have a higher "reserve price" than any other bidder. This happens
all the time in bargains. There is never any reason in principle to suppose
that the buyer is paying his own maximum reserve price for the desired
item; all he has to do is to outbid the second-best bid. 2 9

123. U.S. Truck, 800 F.2d at 589.
124. Id. at 590.
125. Official Creditors' Comm. v. Potter Material Serv., Inc. (In re Potter Material
Serv., Inc.), 781 F.2d 99, 103 (7th Cir. 1986).
126. Potter and U.S. Truck are perhaps the strongest and most-cited circuit court
authority for the nevi-value exception. In Anderson v. Farm Credit Bank (In re
Anderson), 913 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 1990), the court affirmed an unreported district court
decision that found a new-value exception; however, the court of appeals opinion
contains no analysis or discussion. Since Potter, the Seventh Circuit in dicta has blown
hot and cold on the continuing validity of the new-value exception. Compare Kham &
Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990) with In re
Snyder, 967 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1992).
127. 62 B.R. 983, 986-89 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986).
128. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 207-08 (1988).
129. As the story goes: "I don't have to outrun the bear, I just have to outrun you."
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Potter,Jartran,and U.S. Truck are also "no value" cases in this sense.
If Justice White really meant what he said in Ahlers about "new value," then
these cases are no longer good law. But it is not clear that Justice White
understood the full implications of rejecting the "no value" principle; hence,
it is not at all clear that his airy dismissal would hold in another case.
In re Outlook/Century, Ltd.' 30 also supports, at least indirectly, the
distinction set forth here, even though the court refused to recognize the
new-value exception. The debtor was a limited partnership that owned an
office building with a market value of $11.7 million. The debtor had secured
debt of $18 million, and the only unsecured claim was for $450,000. On the
secured creditor's motion for relief from the automatic stay, the court
framed the issue on the predicate that it must give relief if no plan can be
confirmed as a matter of law. The court stated that a plan based on
contribution of new capital would not justify the equity holders' retaining an
interest. In a footnote, the court distinguished the situation in which the old
equity owners bid in at sale: "Such a situation does not implicate the new
value exception at all, because debtor would not retain or receive property
'on account of its equity interest, if it purchased at a sale that was open to
other purchasers and at which the debtor had no advantage.""' Thus, the
court implicitly seems to have assumed that plans like those in Jartran,
Potter, or U.S. Truck are permissible. However, the Outlook/Century court
would regard these cases as irrelevant to, rather than an application of, the
new-value exception.
In any event, there does not appear to be any case in which the court
rejects a "new value" plan where old equity appears to be the highest and
best bidder.' A much different sort of problem arises when the debtor
This "reserve price" analysis has some nuances that are worth noting. Suppose the
residuary owners would pay $100 while the "next best" reserve price is $90. In
principle, the unpaid creditor (or creditor group) ought to be willing to push the bidding
all the way up to $100, secure in the knowledge that the residuary owners will take it at

that price. The real world of imperfect information is more sticky than that, of course.
In a more typical case, the creditors will have to play a game of chicken with the debtor,
bidding up the property as far as they dare while weighing the prospect that the residuary
owners will outbid them against the possibility that the residuary owners will fold and

leave the creditors stuck with it.
130. 127 B.R. 650, 656 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991); see also In re Triple R Holdings,
L.P., 134 B.R. 382 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991), rev'd, 145 B.R. 57 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
131. Outlook/Century, 127 B.R. at 654 n.4; see also In re Drimmel, 108 B.R. 284,
290 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1989) (to the same effect), aff'd, 135 B.R. 410 (D. Kan. 1991),
aff'd sub nom. Unruh v. Rushville State Bank, 987 F.2d 1506 (10th Cir. 1993).
132. Going over similar ground, James J. White gives a shrewd account of facts and
possible motivations in these cases, but he seems to be bent mainly on endorsing creditor

hardball. It is not clear that he takes account of the stakes of competing creditors. See
White, supra note 106.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/7
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is not necessarily the highest bidder-where, typically, the residual owners
are trying to claim a stake in the reorganized company while resisting all
efforts to submit it to any competitive valuation.
There is yet another class of "new value" cases where the motivations
are entirely different, even though the stakes may be the same. These are
the cases in which the old equity is trying to hold onto the assets without
showing that she is, in fact, the highest and best bidder. There are basically
two strategies here. One is to try to show that what the old owners are
getting is not "on account" of their former stake. The other (less visible, but
still apparent to the careful observer) is to suggest that the old owners ought
to be permitted to stay in even if they are taking on account of their old
claim. On this second kind of "new value" issue, there is a real split of
authority, but cases on both sides of the issue may be instructive.
The core strategy in these cases is to try to "run with the hare and hunt
with the hounds": to find some way to show that old creditors are getting
all of the old value, and that the new value is just that-payment for
something other than what creditors are entitled to. The difficulty is that the
value of the enterprise must be the discounted present value of the
prospective future income stream. 3' In order to constitute an internally
consistent notion of value, courts must find something that will belong to the
postdischarge debtor that does not also belong to the present creditors.
Judges have shown marvelous ingenuity in trying to square this circle, but
their approaches have largely been unpersuasive.
One such effort, noteworthy only because it is better than most, is
Judge Lief Clark's opinion in the much-noted Greystone case.134 The old
equity owners proposed a $500,000 equity infusion "to be used both to fund
payments to creditors and for future operations." 1 35 The objecting secured
creditor offered to pay off trade debt and to finish some project improvements, but refused to provide working capital unless it took over ownership.
Judge Clark stated that the creditor therefore did "not represent a viable

133. This language is the jargon of modern finance, see BREALEY & MYERS, supra
note 41, at 12-125; but the idea is deeply embedded in bankruptcy doctrine. See
Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 526 (1941); 5 COLLIER ON

BANKRUPrcY, supra note 18, 1129.03(f)(ii). See generally Isaac M. Pachulski, The
Cram Down and Valuation Under Chapter11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 58 N.C. L. REV.
925 (1980). On the practical difficulties of valuation, see Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas
M. Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1061 (1985); Peeples, supra
note 106, at 83-90.
134. In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 102 B.R. 560 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989), aft'd,
127 B.R. 138 (W.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd, 995 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
113 S.Ct. 772 (1992).
135. Id. at 561.
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36
alternative source of working capital for the future of the entity."
Moreover, Case itself (as quoted by Judge Clark) insists that the plan must
preserve the "full right of priority against the corporate assets. "137 Accordingly, Judge Clark's decision would seem to require a holding that there
is some sort of property right that is available to the old equity, but not to
the dissenting creditor.
Is this in fact what he holds? It is hard to tell; he dances around the
issue, but never quite embraces it. However, he seems to draw a distinction
between the discounted present value of the prospective future income
stream and the contingent right to enjoy some kind of unexpected return. He
notes that the old investors are willing to invest some $500,000 for the right
to enjoy that option; and he notes that the project "would be $500,000
poorer without it." 3 '
But this analysis seems mistaken in two respects. First, it is an error to
distinguish the discounted present value of the prospective future cash flow
from the supposed unexpected return. Properly understood, the present value
impounds the market's best guess as to the prospective income under all
contingencies. 39 Thus, the contingent right to enjoy the gain should
already be implicit in the discounted present value. Second, it is wrong to
imply that the creditor is refusing to provide working capital. On Judge
Clark's own recital, the creditor's refusal extended only to the situation
where the old equity owners remain in control. That leaves open the
possibility that the creditor might be perfectly willing to provide working
capital so long as it enjoyed the option of gain implicit in control.
Judge Clark adds a tantalizing footnote, suggesting (somewhat
indirectly) that he understands the full bite of his new-value conception:

It is important to emphasize that, due to the nature of the Case
capital infusion exception, it is inappropriate to approach the problem
as though the ownership of the enterprise were up for sale. That is
simply not the issue at all. Instead, the question is whether there is an
available source of capital to fund the plan. By the time one gets to the
Case extension, one is already beyond whether the plan itself is
otherwise proper. In other words, the issue of where to get the cash to
make the plan work is not an opportunity to undermine the plan.
Instead, if the plan fails, then another party in the case with standing

136. Id. at 577.
137. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 122 (1939), quoted in
Greystone, 102 B.R. at 574.
138. Greystone, 102 B.R. at 580.
139. For a standard exposition of the essentials here, see BREALEY & MYERS, supra
note 41, at 4-5 and passim.
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may propose an alternative plan. At confirmation, the court is not at
liberty to "conduct an auction" of the equity.' 4°
This sounds suspiciously like bootstrapping, in that he lets the alleged newvalue contribution rest on a plan whose validity is, for the moment,
presumed rather than decided. It also suggests that Judge Clark understood
the need to try to justify his unwillingness to permit market valuation.
The same flavor emerges from the first true new-value case under the
Code, In re Landau Boat Co.141 In Landau Boat, the old equity owners1 42 undertook to pay a ten-percent dividend to unsecureds, to contribute
$35,000 as new working capital, and to make a loan commitment of
unspecified value. A creditor asserted that the investment was insufficient
because the debtor, based on capitalized earnings, was worth more than the
equity holders were paying for it. The court rejected this objection and
stated that the investors were "making a substantial investment which

140. Greystone, 102 B.R. at 577 n.22; cf. In re Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp., 77 B.R. 69,
72 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 881 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1989). In
In re Bjolmes Realty Trust, 134 B.R. 1000 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991), Judge Queenan
explained the difficulty of these valuation principles:
The process is governed by a complex standard of valuation which has come
to be known as 'reorganization value.' It is subtly but substantially different
from traditional going concern value. Although also established through the
multiplication of an earnings figure by a capitalization rate, reorganization
value emphasizes projected earnings of the debtor after it merges from the
ashes following reorganization. Past earnings are taken into account, along
with other factors, but only for the purpose of projecting future earnings. This
is on the theory that the debtor's value, and hence those seeking a share in it,
should not suffer from management's errors of the past. A fact finder is
subject to reversal if he places too much emphasis on the debtor's track record
without taking sufficient account of its future after the reorganization. One
writer furnishes this definition: "Reorganization value is what some appraisers
believe the current market value of the distressed company ought to be if the
present were like the future they foresee." This is quite different from how
a price is arrived at in the actual sale of a business, where a seller's prediction
of future improvements seldom increase the price. ...
Reorganization value is ... an expansive concept of value ... devised

in order to facilitate a finding of solvency and hence permit participation by
stockholders [in the reorganized company].
Id. at 1010 (citations omitted).
141. 13 B.R. 788 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981). For additional explanation of Judge
Pelofsky's thinking, see In re Landau Boat Co., 8 B.R. 436 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981).
142. Judge Pelofsky refers to certain unspecified "new investors." But elsewhere he
says that "shareholders of the corporation presently holders of the debtor's stock" had
offered to purchase the new issue. The plan also provided that creditors had the right to
buy in if they wanted to, but there is no suggestion that any did.
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exceeds any value which can be realized from the business in the foreseeable
future. "143
In the context of the present discussion, the holding in Landau seems
vulnerable on two points. First, Judge Pelofsky seems to have accepted the
old equity's value testimony without submitting it to the test of the market.
And second, he seems to have missed the point on value, permitting some
of the old equity's new contribution to remain in the corporation, rather than
being paid to new creditors.
An even balder approach occurs in In re Tallahassee Associates,
L.P. " The court stated that failing to recognize new value "would, in
many instances, subvert the very process of reorganization which the rule
was intended to promote.""' But this is bootstrapping again: the purposes
(if any) of the Code must be derived from the rules it sets forth, not viceversa.
The difficulties in coming up with a defensible exception in the face of
this kind of evidence may help to explain the rich and sophistical store of
qualifications, conditions, etc., on which courts have based the new-value
rule. The canonical formulation is that of Justice Douglas in Case v. Los
Angeles Lumber Products Co. :146
[In an earlier case] this Court stress[ed] the necessity, at times, of
seeking new money "essential to the success of the undertaking" from
the old stockholders. Where that necessity exists and the old stockholders make a fresh contribution and receive in return a participation
reasonably
equivalent to their contribution, no objection can be
47
made. 1
This is passably straightforward, but in gloss the rule becomes much
more florid; not just any new value will do. Rather, as one judge recently
recited the standard formulation, the contribution must be: "(a) money or
money's worth of (b) substantial (c) new value, (d) reasonably equivalent to
the extent of old equity's proposed participation
in the reorganized debtor,
4
and (e) necessary to such reorganization." 1

143. Landau Boat, 13 B.R. at 793.
144. 132 B.R. 712 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991).
145. Id. at 717. But the court refused confirmation, holding that the contribution was

insufficient.
146. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).

147. Id. at 121.
148. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone mI
Joint Venture), 955 F.2d 1274, 1283-84 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting amicus brief of
Professor Elizabeth Warren at 12), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72 (1992). Judge Pusateri
adds that "necessary to the reorganization" does not mean "merely necessary to the
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/7
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Another court used the phrase "substantial and essential." 4 9 In In re
Yasparro, Judge Thomas Baynes observed that the Potter requirement of
substantiality was not in Case. As he correctly noted, the "substantiality"
rule is inconsistent with the idea of "reasonably equivalent. "150 Furthermore, as the court in In re Johnson stated, the new-value exception is

supported by a strong policy consideration: "to permit the infusion of new
capital in a reorganized entity in order to assure that the entity is kept
alive."1' But this rationale is erroneous because it confuses the new-value
problem with the problem of continued operation of the entity. It seems to
assume something like the compulsory continued participation that the court
has rejected.
One other case that deserves notice is In re Bjolmes Realty Trust,
Inc., 2 which represents perhaps the most interesting effort to have it both
ways on the issue. Bjolmes is in many respects a classic one-asset case. The
debtor was a limited partnership, and the objecting creditor held the first
mortgage. The debtor proposed to retain the property for a "new value"
contribution without paying the senior debt in full. Judge Queenan, after an
unusually thorough and informed discussion of the background of the rule,
held that the he would not confirm a plan unless the old equity owners put
the property up for auction, in effect allowing for a holding along the lines
of Jartran,Potter, or U.S. Truck. However, at the last minute, he limited
himself, holding that the auction would take place among existing creditors
"' Judge Queenan made no effort to explain why, if an auction is
only. 53
4
needed at all, it should be so limited.1

debtor's retention of interest." In re Drimmel, 108 B.R. 284, 290 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1989), aft'd, 135 B.R. 410 (D. Kan. 1991), aff'd sub nom. Unruh v. Rushville State
Bank, 987 F.2d 1506 (10th Cir. 1993).
149. In re Creekside Landing, Ltd., 140 B.R. 713, 717 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1992).
Creekside also says that the money must be unavailable from any other source. Id. at 717
(citing In re Jartran, Inc., 44 B.R. 331, 379 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1984); Official Creditors'
Comm. v. Potter Material Serv., Inc. (In re Potter Material Serv., Inc.), 781 F.2d 99,
102 (7th Cir. 1986)). But the Creekside court then seems to go on and ignore its own
holding. See also In re Yasparro, 100 B.R. 91 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989). In Yasparro the
court stated that 'a 'substantial' contribution appears to be less than a 'reasonably
equivalent' contribution." Id. at 97. But it might be more.
150. Yasparro, 100 B.R. at 97.
151. In re Johnson, 101 B.R. 307, 309 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989).
152. 134 B.R. 1000 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
153. Id. at 1010.
154. At least one possible reason exists: in the case of a major publicly held company,
it is likely that putative bidders with big dreams and no real possibility of performance
will be able to destroy the plan process by distraction. But it seems unlikely that this sort
of factor would work in this case; and in any event, there is no suggestion that this was
what Judge Queenan had in mind.
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Decisions rejecting the new-value exception are at least as numerous as
those in support of it, but they are conceptually not as interesting. Judges
who reject the rule tend to view it in large part as a matter of "plain
meanings," construing any effort to inject a new-value rule as an effort to
distort the face of the text.'55 However, "plain meaning" is more slippery
a concept than it seems. Of course, there is no single phrase in the Code
that says, in so many words, "The old equity owners may retain an interest
on a contribution of new value." But that is not the end of the inquiry.
There was no language of this sort in old Chapter X or old section 77B
either. If new value was good law under the predecessor statutes, then
arguably it plainly remains so today.' 56 The new-value exception may be
part of the Code, even absent language of this sort, if it is consistent with
the plain meaning of the statute taken as a whole. 5 7 Thus, for example,
the Code provides that no junior class may retain an interest under a cramdown plan "on account of [its] claim or interest." 5 ' On the other hand,
if the retention is "on account of" something else, then the retention may be
justified within the plain meaning of the Code. The question, thus, becomes:
what sorts of retentions are "on account of [a prior] claim or interest"?
This, too, may be a matter of plain meaning, although it is not always clear
exactly how plain the meaning might be.
It is not surprising, then, that courts which reject the new-value
exception support themselves with something other than bald declarations of

155. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bryson Properties XVII (In re Bryson Properties XVIII),
129 B.R. 440 (M.D.N.C. 1991), rev'd, 961 F.2d 496 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 191.
156. Cf. In re SLC Ltd. V, 137 B.R. 847, 852 (Bankr. D. Utah 1992) (holding that
lack of any legislative history expressly eliminating the exception compels a finding that
it survives) (relying on Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992)); Penn Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Woodscape Ltd. Partnership (In re Woodscape Ltd. Partnership), 134 B.R. 165,

168 (Bankr. D. Md. 1991) (stating that the new-value principle is not an "exception,"
but "an acknowledgement by courts that it is possible for new equity to be invested in
a reorganizing enterprise"). Judge Thomas Carlson offers an interesting, but unpersuasive, response on this point. He argues that the § 77B exception was "judicially created,"
and that Congressional failure to specify "new value" counts as a rejection of the rule.
In re Outlook/Century Ltd. 127 B.R. 650, 651 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991). But this

assumes that Case and its kin were somehow inconsistent with the statute as it stood.
There is no satisfactory basis for any such assumption.
157. In this same vein, in an earlier article I criticized discussions of new value that
seemed to turn on whether the principle had been overruled by the new Chapter 11. See
Ayer, supra note 105, at 1016-19. I argued that the language on all critical points was

identical before and after the adoption of the new Code. I also argued that no case
actually applied "new value" under the old Code. Neither of these points seems to have

influenced the debate.
158. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1988).
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plain meaning. One popular interpretative device is to compare the structure
of Chapter 11, taken as a whole, with the structure of old Chapter X. On
this inquiry, judges typically attach meaning to the fact that Congress in new
Chapter 11 did away with the old unanimity requirement, instead permitting
confirmation with respect to a particular class on the appropriate majority
vote. 159
Representative, and perhaps the most notorious, of these opinions is
Judge Edith Jones' opinion in Greystone. 1' Judge Jones, speaking for a
three-judge panel, reversed Judge Lief Clark's decision, which is discussed
above. Judge Jones' opinion is interesting in that it does not purport to rest
on unvarnished statutory plain meaning. Rather, she begins by saying it is
"not obvious" that new value survives into the new Code, noting that the
new reorganization provisions "differ markedly from the prior law. "161
But she goes on to note that Chapter 11, unlike old Chapter X, allows lessthan unanimous consent, and that "this increased flexibility arguably renders
the Case exception unnecessary. "62 She goes on to say that the rest of the
argument is "mere wordplay," and that Greystone's attempt to retain
ownership is predicated on its status as the old equity owner; therefore, it
must be on account of its status.16 Judge Jones seems to take it as
axiomatic that new value and absolute priority cannot coexist.
Other holdings support Judge Jones in her exegesis."' Another court
recalled that the drafters of the Code had considered and chosen not to
specify the typical new-value scheme, thus compelling a conclusion that they
meant not to adopt it.Y6
V. SuMMARY: AGAINST PYRRHONIsM

The point of this exercise has been to suggest that in one arena, at least,
there is no pattern or predictability to bankruptcy cases. If I am correct, how
is that no one has made this argument before? Several reasons suggest
themselves. One has to do with the nature of scholarship. Scholars and

159. See id. § 1126.
160. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone E[ Joint Venture (In re Greystone MI
Joint Venture), 995 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72 (1992).
161. Id. at 1282.
162. Id.; see also In re Lumber Exch. Ltd. Partnership, 125 B.R. 1000, 1007 n.10
(Bankr. D. Minn.), aff'd, 134 B.R. 354 (D. Minn. 1991), aff'd, 968 F.2d 647 (8th Cir.

1992).
163. Greystone, 995 F.2d at 1283.

164. See, e.g., In re Outlook/Century Ltd., 127 B.R. 650 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991).
165. In re Drimmel, 135 B.R. 410 (D. Kan. 1991) (citing and accepting the reasoning

of Ayer, supranote 105, at 978-79), aff'd sub nom. Unruh v. Rushville State Bank, 987
F.2d 1506 (10th Cir. 1993).
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teachers get paid for creating categories, not for denying the existence of
categories. We remember Newton not for telling us that the earth and an
apple were different, but that they were the same." 6 So the great names
of the law, such as Williston and Langdell, are those who propounded
unifying theories that cut through the welter of doctrine.
Something similar holds among practicing lawyers. As lawyers, we
spend our time identifying points of sameness from the nuck of disparity. If
two superficially similar instances seem to differ, we are inclined to take it
as a failure of intellect, or even of character, on our part; and it may be.
Or, it may just as well be an error or a purposeful refraction on somebody
else's part.
I do not mean to deprecate the value of abstraction. Certainly if we did
not abstract and simplify, we could never speak or think at all, because no
two things are precisely alike; everything is unique. The reader can be
assured that there is indeed a category called "bankruptcy" and that useful
generalizations can be made about it. But unifying principles come in many
forms. And while I deny that there is any "core idea" to govern the oneasset bankruptcy case, I do suggest that there is an intelligible reason for the
lack of a core idea; and this intelligible reason may perfectly well constitute
a "core idea" all its own. The difficulty, if there is one, is only that we have
moved to a separate logical plane.
In an earlier draft, the title of this Article was "Bankruptcy as an
Evasion." But I do not wish to be misunderstood. As a concept, evasion
needs a press agent. To impute evasion to bankruptcy might be understood
as accusing bankruptcy of having failed to meet some obligation that it
should serve. This is not at all what I mean. Rather, let me make clear that
I have no particular hostility to evasions: I think they can serve a useful
purpose in the law, and in society. If each of us knew what the rest of us
were thinking-really thinking-at any given moment, we would probably
be at war all the time.
There are good reasons for shoving problems under the table and for
making the rally 'round symbols of unity. 67 You pay a price for this sort
of thing, of course, but I am not so sure the price is always as high as we

166. In another of Newton's fields, optics, he asserted the same sort of sameness under
the seeming diversity of color. It was left to Goethe, in revulsion against Newton's
attempt to impoverish the world of sense, to propose a theory of color that emphasized
difference rather than sameness. We remember Goethe as an artist, not a scientist, and
his theory of color scarcely at all. For a fascinating account of Goethe and Newton, see
THEODORE RoszAK, WHERE THE WASTELAND ENDS (1972).
167. See PETER MARRIs, Loss AND CHANGE (1974) on how Charles II preserved the
security of the Jewish community in England in the years before the Civil War by
making sure the issue never surfaced. (Or, if you can't find that, how Queen Elizabeth
I maintained an unsteady religious peace by making sure never to face the issue).
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suppose it is. For example, it is probably true that the world is a somewhat
less predictable place than it would be if the rules were neater. But from the
standpoint of litigation, I suspect that good lawyers probably exercise a
palpable (and marketable) skill in narrowing the bounds of uncertainty,
whatever the stated general rules. And from the standpoint of transaction
planning-I doubt very much that the limited partners who face huge
partnership rollups gave much thought, one way or another, to the question
whether they would be able to hang onto their assets through the bankruptcy
process-the likelihood is that they did not think about the downside much
at all. And if they did, they probably figured that if the problem arose, they
would fight like the devil with means to be selected as the opportunity
presented itself when the time came.
Finally, there is good reason to believe that "clear" rules are never as
clear as they seem. The more precise and specific, the more energy the
parties expend in developing means of coping with the resulting inconve16
nience. 1
"What is truth? said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer.")1 69 Bacon's jibe is understood to reflect badly on Pilate, but perhaps
he knew more than we give him credit for. Holmes said that it is the genius
of the common law to decide the case first and think of the reason
afterwards. Justice is not only blind; at times she seems developmentally
disabled as well. In a perfect world, you might want more. But in a perfect
world, you would not need justice at all.

168. Take the topic of "offer and acceptance," which virtually every law student
studies in her first-year contracts course. Every well-taught law student should learn two
kinds of things: (1) a set of rules and sub-rules governing offer and acceptance; and (2)
a system of devices and strategies for avoiding the force of offer and acceptance rules
when they prove inconvenient. This two-tiered lesson is summarized in the familiar
principle that a "good" answer to a first-year law exam ought "to go either way," i.e.,
to be argued at least as well from one side as from the other, and perhaps best of all,

from both.
169.

SIR FRANCIS BACON, ESSAYS, "OF TRUTH."
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